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Government Dependency Theory: Public Services, Banking Crisis, and the Likelihood of Protests

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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

University College

International Affairs

Government Dependency Theory:

Public Services, Banking Crisis, and the Likelihood of Protests

by

Titus J. Bickel

A thesis presented to the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

Government Dependency Theory:

Public Services, Banking Crisis, and the Likelihood of Protests

By

Titus J. Bickel

Master of Arts in International Affairs

Washington University in St. Louis, 2014

Professor Dawn Brancati, Chair

The purpose of this research is to determine what causes certain countries to experience mass protests during economic crises while other governments weather the same events and emerge unscathed. Further research on this topic could predict the likelihood of protests that lead to state collapse in countries like Ukraine. I argue that high gross domestic product expenditure on social services creates a dependent society that will protest when those goods and services are threatened by banking crisis. I originated this theory and titled it the Government Dependency Theory. My theory uses data from 147 banking crises occurring in 115 countries from 1979 to 2013 to point out this causal connection between state services and protests. My Government Dependency Theory argues that countries with a citizenship that is highly dependent on government provided social services is more likely to have violent protests when banking crises threaten those benefits promised by its government.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States was unprepared for the mass protests that forced President Viktor Yanukovich to flee the Ukrainian capital on February 22, 2014. Despite the unprecedented access to information, experts disagree on what motivated over one million people to mobilize in anti-government protests. I research the occurrence of protests at the *Theoretical, Global, State, Community, and Individual Levels* of study from 1979-2013. From global databases to in-person interviews, my research supports that when populations are dependent on government provided public goods and services, they will mobilize in protests when economic constraints threaten the delivery of those benefits. The percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on public services depicts the government's size and scope, and therefore, is the best measure of the citizen's potential dependence on the continuation of those services. This perspective is a new theory that I created, authored, and titled the Government Dependency Theory. Further protest research on the five *Levels* of study could identify populations at high risk of mass protest and prevent future unrest. After global trend analysis, case study research, and expert interviews, it is apparent that countries with a citizenship that is highly dependent on government provided social services will experience increased numbers of protests when economic crises threaten those benefits.

Every country is at risk of economic crisis at some point, but it remains uncertain which countries will experience political protests. Protests increase in countries like Ukraine, Greece, and Spain during economic crisis while Estonia, Belarus, and Georgia experience a decrease in protests during crises of a similar scale. Are certain cultures simply inclined to protest, unionize, or join political organizations? I studied 147 cases of economic crisis in 115 countries from the

years 1979 to 2013. These cases occurred in countries with various levels of democracy, GDP, conflict, and cultural cleavages. Increased protests occurred in a portion of these cases without an apparent disposition toward protests. Because mass political mobilizations are seemingly random, countries navigate economic crises blind without knowing if executing the next policy will cause mass protests.

Nations vie for independence, political reform, and increased freedoms using protests as their primary tool, yet it remains uncertain why some movements gain popular support. Protest participation in some countries dramatically increases during economic crisis while other countries experience a decline in their numbers. What causes this swing in protest support during economic crisis and not during any other event? Determining activists' attraction to grassroots movements and their demographics help identify factors that at-risk environments have in common. Academia attempts to sort out this quagmire, but inconsistencies prevent the application of current theories to mass protests.

The type and amount of support for protests could determine the likelihood of mass anti-government movements, civil war, and violence. Popular support for protests can precede civil war as seen in Ukraine's 2014 coup, while weak support from fringe extremists can instigate a rebellion as seen in Peru's 1979 Shining Path insurgency. Other cases end due to government suppression or a lack of support like the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States. These instances started with protests and took divergent paths of unrest. What is the difference among these cases? Outcomes to protests seem just as random as the time and place in which they occur. Further research could identify the threat level associated with assembled masses during economic crises and inform future policies.

Protests during economic crises reverse policies, free political prisoners, and overthrow regimes overnight. Diplomacy and military action did not spur such events in the wake of the 2009 economic crisis; they are the outcomes of anti-government demonstrations. A vast amount of study ignores the internal workings of a country and claims that the state is a single-minded actor that influences global events and international relations according to its desired outcome. This theme continues despite the demonstrated global effect of protests throughout history. Governments of both established and emerging countries realize this truth, and as a result, fear and respect protests because of their complex and powerful nature (Mearsheimer 2014).

Unmeasured side effects ripple out from protests whether they depose governments, start civil wars, or influence policymakers' poor decisions. International conflicts started by protests distract US foreign policy with damage control actions while ambitious campaigns of global warming, peace, and democracy take a back seat. The Ukrainian civil war has a death toll of 4,000 and rising. Austerity measures grip Italy, Greece, and France, leaving their economies in stagnation while otherwise profitable years slip away. Overactive Cold War rhetoric re-emerged in international communications and emboldened old adversaries. Russia's new confrontational relationship with NATO pushes the country into closer relations with China. This generates regional unrest, economic losses, reduces foreign direct investment (FDI), and creates cleavages along heretical and lingual divisions (Boyer 2014).

Protests led to Ukraine's coup and Russia's Crimean land grab in 2014. Whether Putin acted to bolster domestic polls or because of a genuine attachment to the peninsula, the coup gave him the opportunity to cross an international red line unchecked. His actions undermined international law, Ukraine's sovereign territory, and the United States' foreign policy objectives. Although not previously a priority, an unknown country in Eastern Europe experienced protests

that evolved into a pivotal struggle of NATO vs. Russian expansionism. This is the power of protests and the reason we should study this anomaly to a larger extent (Taylor 2013).

My research isolates state policies as the cause of protests during economic crisis. This thesis claims that a statistical correlation exists between populations who grow dependent on social services and increased protests when those services are threatened by economic crisis. The dependence is a difficult but necessary aspect to explore. Dependency on services is usually created by government structures and programs not familiar to the average US citizen. Governments with dependent populations are intimately involved in its people's daily lives. Services reach beyond pensions, welfare, and employment to education, infant daycare, and the housing given to broad segments of society. For this reason, I use the state's percentage of GDP expenditure on goods and services to measure the government's size and impact on its citizen's lives. This is a uniform and easily accessed measurement comparable across all 147 cases of crisis. This paper does not make any normative statements about the provision of social services. Instead, it presents information based on the five *Levels* of research. Based on these findings, I provide suggestions in the Policy Implications section at the end of the paper to be used solely for reducing protests and not for the welfare or economic success of the nation.

Grassroots movements likely form when economic crises and possible state bankruptcies threaten the continued supply of wide-ranging government functions. Protests are driven by the individual's perception of injustice and as a result, protesters are highly diverse. The masses assemble in public areas without a message, leader, or central complaint. Instead, their collective complaints, although diverse, are attributable to one source - government failures to meet promised services. This is an inherent aspect of heavily socialist governments. Citizens see public services as a social contract between themselves and the government. When provisions

are threatened, citizens view it as the government's failure to uphold its end of the social contract, making a victim of all those that it serves (Stokes 1994). Economic crises have an increasingly devastating effect on high expenditure states because they are required to increase safety net expenditures to support the new demographic of unemployed that call on the government to uphold its end of the social contract.

According to the Government Dependency Theory, governments that privatize industries like healthcare, natural resources, and retirement will experience fewer political protests from the masses. This is a beneficial side effect of segregating the provision of services. When crisis threatens the industry, the diverse suppliers do not attract mass movements because their customer base is relatively small. In privatized countries, threats to pensions provided by company W will cause its customers to mobilize to protest the injustice. This is a relatively small group of people because the market system thrives on competition among multiple corporations. Protests decrease in these states because other parts of society rely on companies X, Y, and Z for their retirements to continue. My theory argues that protests only occur out of self-interest, thus reducing the participants when diversifying the population's concerns.

Diversifying the public's interests is also accomplished by segmenting the workforce into numerous self-interested unions with few negotiating rights. When numerous issues arise without a clear entity to blame, fewer protests ensue. When sprawling, nationalistic governments experience economic crisis, citizens, employees, the homeless, the needy, and retirees are all victims of injustice with one entity to blame – the central government.

The threatening or actual removal of services during economic crises differs from austerity measures endured for other reasons (i.e. new political party, self-imposed restructuring of debt). Austerity measures during banking crises are driven by bankruptcy or foreign entities

holding national debts. Domestic crises with available foreign loans at good interest rates do not create protests because they do not signify a true reversal of social policies. Governments use loans to extend benefits, and the public does not notice the rift. Economic crises with mandatory reforms based on bankruptcy create a necessity that cannot be slowed by political processes and therefore is seemingly inevitable.

Social democracies use promised services to sway voters, increasing their expenditure on social goods. After elections, citizens hold the government to its social contract. They mobilize to keep promised services or replace the leadership with a party who will continue services. The Government Dependency Theory points to the voter effect as the reason for incurring outrageous debts, electing unfit leadership, and the continuing of shortsighted and unsustainable levels of social services. The voter effect does not occur in African countries, having a decreasing effect on protests in these small government states. Fewer protests are perhaps not due to extensive privatization, but because they are not a priority. The government services program was never used to secure votes, and never became extensive enough to play a large role in the individual's life. Therefore, when the government is threatened, it does not affect the public because their social contract was never elevated for political reasons.

Popular theories claim protests are caused by conflicting international powers, cultural cleavages, and increased socioeconomic status. These theories are applicable to broad societal themes or to specific case studies. However, further research shows that they cannot simultaneously apply to the *Global* and *State Level* occurrence of mass protests during economic crisis. Theories attributing all protests to one dynamic, attempt to explain too much with too little. The scope of this thesis is not to understand all protests. More simply, I study factors which contribute to the incidence of mass protests during economic crises. This enables me to isolate

state expenditures as the specific cause of increasing and decreasing protests across a broad sample set of countries. This paper contributes a new idea to the field of study. The Government Dependency Theory uses existing research on protest mobilization, socioeconomic status, and political participation to confirm components of my argument. Current protest research is extensive, but it does not connect the removal of services to political protests during times of economic crises.

The Government Dependency Theory complements political science, sociological, and economic studies without contradicting them. I argue against conflicting theories with insights and analyses from the academic community, experts in the field, and my experiences. Theories supporting my thesis are adapted to this work but are not inflated or taken out of context. This theory is situated among respected academic works and can coexist while offering a new framework to study protests during economic crisis. This thesis will hopefully answer some questions, but create more quandaries for further research.

The Government Dependency Theory is falsifiable, collectively exhaustive, and mutually exclusive. I use the state's expenditure of GDP on services as the most direct measure of the size and scope of government involvement, and therefore, the level of civilian dependence on those goods and services. Using high GDP expenditure to represent a society's increased dependence on its government, protest patterns became evident. This thesis relies on a correlation between high rates of GDP expenditure on social services and increasing protests during economic crisis. Conversely, states with smaller amounts of GDP expenditure on social services experience a decrease in protests during crisis years. I found correlations necessary to strengthen the Government Dependency Theory on five *Levels* of study.. For example, France spent 48% of GDP on government services in 2008, and it experienced a 67% increase in protests versus non-

crisis years. Conversely, Spain only spent 12% during its crisis in 1980 and had a reduction of 78% in protests. This roughly demonstrates the trend found in the in my database consisting of 147 cases of banking crises from the years 1979 to 2013.

Case studies of Ukraine, Estonia, Hungary, and Peru strengthen the *State Level* of my research. Estonia and Ukraine are similar demographically and historically while maintaining vastly different ideologies concerning social provisions and, therefore, experience with protests. Ukraine, whose population is highly dependent on government programs, experienced an increased number of protests while Estonia's population, which is highly capitalistic and not dependent on the government, experienced a decrease in the number of protests. Critics may claim that these two countries are not comparable enough for studying the qualitative angle of this theory. Therefore, I also compare Hungary's two economic crises that occurred in close succession. I replicate this method by using Peru's two crises. Choosing two crises in the same country holds the demographics, government dispositions, and civilian expectations of services constant.


On the *Community Level*, polls confirm my theory by showing protesters in Ukraine had very little in common with each other demographically. The crowds had diverse measures of religion, age, income level, and language, yet they gathered in unison to protest. How was this possible? The Government Dependency Theory claims that the people in the plazas had one important thing in common – they all had perceived injustice when the government broke the social contract by removing services from its citizens.

This paper successfully applies the Government Dependency Theory to five *Levels* of society by zeroing in on the individual level from a wide scope of study. After exploring the existing research in the field, I provide a detailed synopsis of my argument and its data and

measures. I include interviews with experts on the topic and my overall analysis of their contribution to my theory. I conclude the paper with suggested policy implications that have the ability to reform governments and reduce the likelihood of protests during future economic crises.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Russia procures Ukrainian territories and a civil war defined by cultural cleavages ensues. This episode and others around the world seem to confirm Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*. In this work, he claims cultural cleavages will increasingly



Cartoon from *the Economist* (2014) that strengthens the false stereotype that existing cultural hatreds define today's conflicts.

beget global unrest in the post-Cold War era. "As R.R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings are over; the wars of peoples has begun"" (Huntington 1993). Popular media, policymakers, and academic theorists claim intrastate conflicts like protests and civil wars are based on a variation of Huntington's concept. This vantage point neglects cultural understanding, blankets entire cultures with preconceived notions, and harms possible resolutions of global conflicts by deeming them lost causes. Blaming entrenched and historical cultural divisions for conflict prevents further research into the real cause (Lada 2014).

On the *Theoretical Level*, *The Clash of Civilizations* falsely claims that cultural cleavages in Israel/Palestine, Eastern Europe/Russia, and the Balkans have the power to cause unrest, protest, and civil war. "A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural [diverseness]" (Huntington 1993). After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, people supposedly clung to cultural heterogeneity, which then became more important than their loyalty to the state. Gordon Anderson (2011) takes this theory a step further by saying cultures have different traditions, religions, and ethics. As a country matures, these religions and customs serve as the

basis for enforceable national laws. This creates a problem when one ethnicity governs a diverse population and enforces its culturally based laws (Anderson 2011). *The Clash of Civilizations* does not withstand scrutiny in today's post-Cold War era. States with high levels of diversity live in peace while theories citing poverty, weak government institutions, and political instability as reasons for unrest grow in popularity (Kuzio and Danieri 2002; *Protesting Predictions* 2014; *Why Does Ukraine Have So Many Revolutions* 2013).

The Clash of Civilizations measures the conflict too late in the stream of events. The theory claims cultural animosity was the cause for protests, but the reverse is actually true. Protests and disruption created the environment for these hatreds to thrive. Research shows that state leadership takes advantage of crises and often inflates cultural cleavages for political, social, or economic gain. Therefore, ethnic cleavages are a result of conflict and not the instigator (Posner 2004).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) say cultural unrest is not on the rise and claim that Ukraine is not a product of a *The Clash of Civilizations*. The political conflicts we see today are not an outcome of increased cultural rifts following the Cold War as Huntington claims. Instead, they are an "accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950's and 1960's" (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The rise of civil conflicts did not start in the post-Cold War 90's. The current rate of 25 ongoing civil wars was already reached in the mid 1980's. Therefore, the civil and cultural conflicts that Huntington blamed on ethnic cleavages were accumulating in the 1950's and 1960's. Fearon and Laitin conclude the outbreak of civil wars is more likely due to decolonization that sprouted new and poor nation-states with weak government institutions.

I tested *The Clash of Civilizations* theory against my 115-country database to look for a connection between diversity and protests. Similar to Fearon and Laitin, I used a

Figure 1

Ethnic Fracturization and Protests

■ Ethnic Fracturization ■ % Increase / Decrease in Crisis Years




Figure 2

Linguistic Fracturization and Protests

■ Linguistic Fracturization ■ % Increase / Decrease in Crisis Years





Figure 3

Religious Fracturization and Protests

■ Religious Fracturization ■ % Increase / Decrease in Crisis Years



Source: Fearon 2003; Laeven and Valencia 2012; GDELT 2014

database of linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity (Figures 1,2, and 3). The graph on the previous page shows that as diversity increases from left to right, there is no correlation between increased diversity and protests during economic crisis. Figure 3 shows that states with an ethnically similar population experienced more protests during economic crisis. This shows the opposite of what *Clash of Civilization* theorizes. Citizens do not cling to their cultural heritages enough during economic crisis to create unrest. The data shows that the only element that has a slight inclination to protests is ethnic unity and not division.

When considering Ukrainian demographics, it is understandable why the media blames cultural cleavages for unrest. Ukrainian populations consist of 17.3% Russians and 77.8% Ukrainians with small amounts of Romanians, Bulgarians, and Crimean-tartars (Democratic Initiatives 2013). The Economist cites this as a reason for Ukraine's revolutions - "The lands that now constitute Ukraine had previously been carved up between Russia, Poland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Duchy of Lithuania and the Crimean Khanate. This splintered history, as the theory goes, means that Ukraine is an artificial creation rather than a natural, coherent state. The interventions of outside powers seem to reflect and reinforce this sense of a hopelessly divided identity" (Why does Ukraine have so many revolutions? 2014).

When comparing the case studies of Estonia and Ukraine, the characteristics do not conform to *Clash of Civilizations*. Estonia's demographics are composed of 68.6% Estonians, 25.6% Russian, 2.1% Ukrainian, and 1.2% Belarusians (Estonia Demographics Profile 2013). This makes Estonia more diverse than Ukraine, but after experiencing the same level of banking crisis, they had vastly different responses from the public. Estonia experienced a reduction during its economic crises in 1992 and 2009 while Ukraine's protests increased during its crises

in 1998 and 2008. Additionally, the protesters in Ukraine discussed with the media their diversity as a positive characteristic of the movement in February, 2014.

“The movement is highly diverse, with Euromaidan protesters representing a wide range of ages, income, education and abilities. Both the violent and non-violent resistance in Kyiv includes representatives from all political camps as well as non-ideological persons who may have problems locating themselves politically. Not only the peaceful protesters, but also those using sticks, stones and even Molotov Cocktails, in their physical confrontation with police special units and government-directed thugs, constitute a broad movement that is not centralized” (Bohdanova 2014).

According to this testimony, diversity and ethnic cleavages did not instigate the 2014 coup as the *Clash of Civilizations* theory would suggest. Polls taken in Ukrainian plazas verify this theme:

Table 1
Diversity of Ukrainian Protestors

92%	Do not identify with a political party
55%	Speak Ukrainian
16%	Speak Russian
24%	Spoke mixture of Russian and Ukrainian
83%	Arrived on their own without any NGO, Organization, or group
56%	Men
47%	Women
12% Kiev, 55% Western, 24% Central, 21% East + South	
12% higher educated, 9% students, 9% entrepreneurs, 9% pensioners, 8% managers, 7% workers, 40% specialists, 17.5% unemployed/part time workers	

(Source: Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2013)

The poll results in Table 1 are representative of Ukraine’s diverse population who all participated together in opposition to the government. Additional Ukrainian polls show that the desires of the masses ranged from more public services, less corruption, resignation of the government, and resignation of the President. Crimean populations also ranked “interethnic relations” last in a list

of concerns in 2013 (USAID 2013). Diversity did not cause the public's distaste for the government and was not the cause of protests leading to regional unrest. Protesters lived in the plaza under stressful conditions while maintaining a unified front. Ethnic hatred did eventually become a factor in starting Ukraine's civil war. However, *Clash of Civilizations* measures cultural cleavages after a conflict already begins. Leadership driven by political, social, and economic gain tries to harness the energy of the masses and leverage the cleavages and unrest that Huntington cites (McClosky 2014).

Experts argue that conflicts are due to high levels of ethnic cleavages based on race, religion, and linguistic diversity; however, cleavages that incite unrest are activated when politically advantageous. Daniel Posner discovered that animosity between the Chewa and Tumubka ethnicities in two neighboring African countries were based solely on their political relevance. These tribes are allies in Zambia and adversaries in neighboring Malawi. Posner suggests that Malawian leadership instigates ethnic animosity between the two groups because they provide a large voter base capable of political participation to overcome a perceived aggressor. In neighboring Zambia, the tribes are so small that they are treated politically as a collective minority group. They live together in peace as a result. This means cleavages are not based on physical features, religions, or creeds. Instead, those features are bolstered to create animosity for political gain (Posner 2004). Instigation based on cultural differences has gone beyond political mobilization. It incited the murder of over 800,000 men and women during the Rwandan genocide. Rebel leaders used the radio to instigate riots that lashed out at the opposing tribe. Outbursts of violence directly followed these radio broadcasts. Leveraging ethnic differences for political reasons transformed citizens living peacefully together into murderers

seeking the extinction of a minority group (Karnell 2003). This aspect of extremist rhetoric only emerges after disgruntled masses become susceptible to political influences.

Realists like John Mearsheimer use the term *Balancing* to frame the 2014 Ukrainian demonstrations. *Balancing* is when states leverage their powers against each other to gain the upper hand in an endless struggle for limited resources. Mearsheimer says the conflict started when NATO began courting Ukraine as a member-state. This potential militarized relationship with the West encroached on Russia's sphere of influence. When Ukraine was hit by the economic crisis, NATO, the EU, and Russia all proposed economic alliances with the country in an attempt to balance against each other. Mearsheimer claims the conflict came to a head when Ukraine rejected the EU economic recovery deal in order to take Russia's \$15 billion counteroffer. "That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths of some one hundred protesters" (Mearsheimer 2014). The EU and NATO are blamed for instigating the conflict with Russia, leading to Crimea's renationalization and the ensuing civil war. Mearsheimer argues that the international crisis that exists today is because of world powers influencing countries at will, like pawns in a Cold War game of chess (Mearsheimer 2014).


This is a compelling theory, but it hardly explains the cause for the initial protests. Were the people in the Ukrainian plazas worried about their role in international politics or did personal interests motivate them? Because of its banking crisis, Ukraine was no longer able to afford public goods for its people. It is unlikely that the masses overlooked the inability to provide for their families in order to mobilize in the name of the international balance of power. Rather, protests grew because they realized their new inability to sustain their quality of life without government services and subsidies. Polls show the international balance of power was

low on the list of grievances. Protests do not conform to Mearsheimer's theory because *Balancing* concerns state actors at the upper echelons while mass protests are grassroots movements of the people from the more populous levels of society (Mearsheimer 2014; USAID 2013).


Experts often criticize the realist theory of *Balancing* for its inability to explain intrastate events. *Balancing* is valid when considering the situation from an international vantage point, but it cannot explain what influences individuals within the state. Russia is notorious for a poor and corrupt system of administering government services. When Ukraine chose Russia's olive branch, protesters saw their current level of quality and access to services disappear. This case of NATO expansion might strengthen aspects of Mersheimer's *Balancing* vantage point, but how would he explain the other 22 instances of increased European protests during economic crisis? The *Balancing* theory's application to mass protests around the world is weakened by the protesters' political disinterest, diverse grievances, and personal needs.

The *Social Mobilization and Instability* relationship theorizes that protests are due to increasing income, education level, and political participation. This model correlates the advancement of western societies with the increased political participation at state level. "No matter how class is measured, studies consistently show that higher-class persons are more likely to participate in politics than lower-class persons" (Mibrath and Goel 1972). Post-industrial society is advancing by development of the welfare state, including urbanization, general education, specialized workforces, and raised standards of living. These advancements afford citizens more time and access to political information that affects their daily lives. This increased connectivity encourages political activity and results in protests (Mibrath and Goel 1972). Huntington strengthens this theory claiming that "Urbanization, increases in literacy, education,


and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics” (Huntington 1968). These theories have a weak statistical basis and confuse the relationships between elements of the argument. Social mobilization theories measure political trends at the *State Level* and shows statistical increases in voting, signing petitions, or participation in political campaigns (Gurr 1970). My research is not



Source: Pintor et al 2002



Source: Pintor et al 2002



Source: Pintor et al 2002

concerned with these legal and encouraged forms of political participation since they do not strain international relations, cause unrest, or ignite regional instability.

Protests have a slight correlation with voter turnout (Figure 4); however, they are not caused by increased political participation. An even higher level of correlation exists between GDP expenditure and political participation (Figure 6). The average expenditure on social services in my 115 country sample is 19.46% of GDP. Countries that spent below that amount had an average 55% voter turnout, whereas countries that spent above 19.46% had a voter turnout of 69.45%. Continuing on that theme, those that had GDP expenditure over 35% garnered an average 79.23% of voter turnout (Laeven and Valencia 2012; GDELT 2014). This correlation between GDP expenditure and political participation exists because politicians use social goods as an incentive to mobilize voters. This is why voter turnouts coincide with GDP expenditure. Expenditure and voter turnout shows that when the government plays a larger role in the citizen's daily life, he is more inclined to regularly vote to control those benefits and services (Pinter et al 2012).

Correlations between voter turnout, GDP expenditure, and protests are not perfect (Figures 4, 5, and 6). This could be because of the protest vote that often occurs in countries that are dissatisfied with their government. Polls show that high levels of political participation were not the case in Ukraine in the months leading up to the protests. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted a poll in the fall of 2013. The results showed that less than 40% of citizens would definitely vote if the government held a new presidential election (USAID 2013) and that 92% of protesters did not belong to any political affiliated group (Democratic Initiatives 2013). These numbers are significantly low for a nation that overthrew its government six months later and do not reflect the increased political participation and inclination to protest as the *Social Mobilization and Instability* theory claims. These low poll numbers are likely due to the protest vote. In other words a society believes in the democratic process but refuses to participate in an election that it deems illegitimate. This unreliable reaction is why it is not a necessary component of my Government Dependency Theory.

Gurr's theory of *Relative Deprivation* (1970) presents a reasonable cause of protests in countries that are comparatively poorer than their neighbors. As globalization increases access to the internet and different forms of media, populations compare their quality of life with the advancing societies around them. When disparities in education, employment, and public services are seen, they question the competence of their government. Questioning the authority of the government on these grounds will lead to protests and political dissent (Gurr 1970). "As soon as the felt discrepancy becomes too large to bear, the individual becomes active and fights to close the subjective gap" (Simon 2012). Huntington says that poor countries are unstable because they are trying to become rich and not because they are poor. During the Soviet famine in 1921, the delegate Kazatskii claimed they did not want privileges, "We speak only of


equalization... It is not a misfortune when everyone suffers, but if I suffer and my neighbor finds a way not to suffer, then this creates unrest” (Siegelbaum and Suny 1994). A society cut off from its neighbors’ prosperity would be ignorant, poor, and stable (Huntington 1968).

The *Relative Deprivation* theory soon loses credibility when applied to the global level of nations that experience increased protests during economic crisis. According to my protest database, countries with increased protests include regional economic leaders. Countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Iceland all had increased protests ranging from 250% to 2,133% during economic crises. Because these citizens live in the most advanced countries, it is unlikely that they increasingly protested because of *Relative Deprivation* (Locher 2001).

Rudig and Karayotis found that participation in Greece’s protests did not correlate to the individual’s feelings of relative deprivation (Rudig Karayotis 2014). When comparing GDP per capita among countries that experienced economic crisis, there are numerous countries poorer than Ukraine and Greece who did not experience protests. Georgia and Armenia are both poor post-soviet countries on the boundary of Russia that did not experience protests during their banking crises. As seen on the map in Figure 7, increased protests can occur anywhere, despite the relative deprivation felt between states.

The *Relative Deprivation* theory also needs to consider the increasingly connected world today. Even though African countries may not live in the same region, globalization makes everyone aware of Western advancements and a rising South America. According to *Relative Deprivation*, this should increase unrest. However, it is clearly shown in my database and the map in Figure 7, that increasing and decreasing protests occur in states with rich and

Relative Deprivation and Protests



Source: GDELT 2014

poor neighbors alike. Poor countries with smaller government systems not only protest less; rich states with sprawling governments and responsibilities experience exponential increases in protests during economic crisis (Locher 2001).

On the *Community Level*, there is not a consensus on which social class is more likely to protest. Experts argue that the poor have less to lose, endure more disparity, and are more likely to participate in protests against political oppression. Additionally, the rich are less likely to participate in protests because they compare everything they are able to lose against few possible gains (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Conversely, Priven and Cloward (1977) proposed that the poor are not capable of collective actions because their separation from organizations and

political structures prevent their needs from being heard. The poor also do not have the economic means to stop looking for work long enough to challenge the government to change. “Free-riding is thus a very likely option, given the fact that the unemployed might benefit from collective goods without participating directly in collective action to reach these goals” (Lahusen 2013). The ability of these two theories to co-exist with reasonable statistical backing shows that both rich and poor will protest depending on the situation. As polls show, the Government Dependency Theory argues that during mass protests, all classes of society are affected and therefore mobilize in protest.

These theories fail to address the majority of citizens who protested during economic crisis. Citizens were affected on an individual level and chose to fill the streets in protest. Protests did not manifest because of expanding international entities, national cleavages, socioeconomic status, or their relative living standards. Something connected protesters in Ukraine and across the globe during economic crises that experts do not grasp: the citizen’s success and failure depended on the rise and fall of the government. The reliance on government programs and economic actions created a “free-rider” relationship between the government and its people. When Ukraine’s government started defaulting on its loans and allowing international deals to fall through, feelings of insecurity and desperation gripped each dependent citizen on a personal level, necessitating a response. The Government Dependency Theory addresses a time when the populous mobilized in peaceful protest with one another. During the protests in Ukraine, Hungary, and Peru, citizens gathered in a united front against the government. This was followed by violent cultural conflicts. Not every protest leads to civil war, but as discussed in the Introduction, significant protests lead to unrest, economic losses, political appeasement, and

sometimes death. The Government Dependency Theory goes beyond the side effects to explain the root cause in order to prevent future unrest.

III. ARGUMENT

Experts label protests as unpredictable or unavoidable side effects of economic crises. This study uses global databases, polls, and interviews to identify government policies that place countries at a high risk for protests. Political protests started the French and American Revolutions, changed the United States' Jim Crow laws, and rattled long-standing Middle East governments. Protests are seemingly unpredictable and highly dynamic. Some demonstrations gain momentum for trivial reasons, and other honorable causes are ended by flailing support or government suppression. It is the purpose of this study to examine protests during economic crises and determine what gives a movement enough grassroots support to cause disruption. I research economic crises and the propensity of protests on five *Levels*. These levels include: 1) *Theoretical Level* 2) *Global Level* 3) *State Level* 4) *Community Level*, and 5) the *Individual Level*. Only by looking through these lenses can policymakers truly understand the entire picture. The connection between services, government dependency, and protests is a new concept that I created and titled the Government Dependency Theory. This theory states that through government spending on social services, the state creates a dependent population that will protest when the individual's sense of injustice is triggered by removing public services during economic crises.

The 2007-2008 global financial crisis shook the world's confidence in democratic capitalism and plays a large part in this thesis. "Governments had steadily extended entitlements over decades, allowing dangerous levels of debt to develop, and politicians came to believe that they had abolished boom-bust cycles and tamed risk" (What's Wrong with Democracy 2014). Political candidates pandered to the voting public by supplying short-term perks while neglecting

long-term investments. Plato's worst fear of citizens "indulging in the pleasure of the moment," became a reality. The 2009 crisis-inflicted austerity measures could not have happened at a worse time. Increasingly aged Western populations demanding continued pensions and healthcare increase economic hardships. European countries also have a growing disdain and reliance on their government system (Auernheimer 2008; What's Wrong with Democracy 2014).

Sprawling governments originally accumulated powers to provide and regulate an equal distribution of public services. The West accumulated power to compete in a popularity contest during an ideological struggle with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Keynesian governments allotted funding for social benefits during this period to compete with the popular characteristics of Communism. These policies were initially successful during the 50's and 60's when the economy was less complex. By growing to distribute quality services for all, the government became a large part of peoples' daily lives. When economic crises hit, those benefits are threatened or removed (Harvey 2005).


Research in the 1980s claimed that the social welfare structure was a self-demobilizing system that made governments increasingly responsible for its citizens. "They pointed to formidable challenges such as ageing populations [pensions], sluggish economic growth [market intervention by the state], long-term unemployment [unemployment benefits], changing of family structure [single parents] . . . the post-industrialization of labour markets [production losses], collective bargaining [unions cutting profits], the rise of new risks and needs [healthcare], and international pressures" (Vis Kersbergen 2007). The system is further complicated when the government becomes the only means of provision, regulation, and competition. This increases the likelihood of corruption and economic decisions based on

politics instead of fiscal responsibility (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005; Hopkin, Rodriguez, and Pose 2007).

The *Theoretical Level* of the Government Dependency Theory claims that overspending on social services creates a dependent society that will protest when those services are threatened by economic crisis. As seen in the literature review section, popular theories claim that unrest is due to *Balancing*, cultural cleavages, socioeconomic advancements, or relative deprivation. Although these sociological effects may exist, they are not the cause for protests. Protests that amass the numbers seen in Ukraine, Greece, France, and Peru were made possible by unity and not by cultures lashing out at one another. The cultures in countries experiencing protests undoubtedly have diverse religions, cultures, classes, and political affiliations. Polls conducted during protests show wide ranging diversity contained in the anti-government movements. However, this existing diversity did not hinder their collective peaceful protests. The common grief of the public united the diverse groups. They were unified in distaste for the government because it had a large impact on their daily lives and it was failing them (Rudig and Karyotis 2014).

Mass protests can often become violent and evolve into an intrastate war. When a mass protest occurs, the government has the option to violently suppress the uprising, comply with protesters' demands, or allow the overthrow of the government (Figure 8). If the government chooses to confront the protesters, the challengers will remain unified and a possible civil war will ensue between the people and the government. This was seen in Syria, 2011. The protesters can also choose to give in for a variety of reasons and go home like the 2011 Occupy Wall Street Movement in the US.

Government Dependency Theory: Possible Outcomes Flowchart



If the government decides to hand over power to the masses, cultural cleavages are likely created by those who stand to gain economically or politically. A political struggle or civil war will occur to fill the power vacuum, as seen in Ukraine. The government could also choose to resolve the issues and give the protesters what they want by way of loans to continue public services. This option usually results in delaying the problem. Ukraine escaped its economic crisis in 2009 by taking loans to extend services and survived until the coup in 2014. Loans will not shelter the country from protests unless reforms lower GDP expenditure and wean the public off the social services they are dependent upon. The goal of this theory is not to prevent all civil wars since civil wars can arise out of many circumstances. This theory is designed to foresee protests in order to stop the disruption leading to civil war.

Small governments are more likely to reduce mass protests during economic crises because they consist of only a portion of the economy, services, and employment; and therefore,

the peoples' daily lives are not severely affected. These states have thriving small businesses that only require the government to provide security and regulate business transactions. Expectations of the government and its entities are small and demand less tax revenues, limiting growth. As previously stated, an example of a modern state with a small government is Estonia, who experienced no anti-government protests during its economic crises (Simon 2012). Small governments have decentralized powers and are less inclined to be corrupted (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005). They are players in the economy and not the organizers of it. This causes small governments to compete by innovating public services with limited budgets. Most small governments also either went through a period of de-nationalization or never had government held companies. This significantly reduces the size of government and the impact on civilian employment during a crisis.

States that practice Clientelism and Corporatism unintentionally mobilize their populations during economic crises. Clientelism is a dynamic relationship between the government and its people where the superior power provides goods and services to the population in exchange for political support. Corporatism occurs when the government chooses nationalistic reforms to replace unions and private employment with government funded/provided jobs. These two practices create an unhealthy relationship between the government and its people. Employers have a more natural and healthy relationship with workers. Employers need employees on a daily basis and are willing to negotiate to maintain the workforce. Unions are also a necessary entity. Unions combine monetary resources of the weak, negotiate benefits, and act as a mouthpiece that voices concerns to employers. The government makes a crucial mistake by replacing both of these institutions. The government does not need employees on a daily basis. Politicians pander to the public only during tight elections and

political turmoil. This is represented by evidence of increased spending on broad-based public goods in the approach of competitive elections (Nelson 2007). Governments that replace unions remove the mouthpiece, causing civilians to directly confront public officials with grievances. This relationship of government employment and goods provision creates a large population of dependent citizens who voice their concerns through protests (Stokes 1995).

When highly centralized countries like France and Greece have a large number of employees, they indulge the demographic to ensure the party's re-election. This leads to a large overpaid and over dependent population that is likely to protest when pensions and employment are threatened. Small governments take advantage of a workforce that is divided between government and private employment. This keeps the diversity of the population at a manageable level so that there are no common grievances against the government during economic crises. Protests are less likely when everyone is concerned with his own well-being and with different sources of employment, energy, healthcare, and housing. The government should strive to make a society of individuals with diverse concerns that are divided enough to impede grassroots protest campaigns.

The book *Privatization in Latin America: Myths and Reality* explains the failures of state owned industry in Latin America. The authors claim that government-owned businesses fail because they are not publicly traded and abide by political rather than market forces. This bureaucratic influence causes managers to choose politically satisfying but inefficient methods of production and investment that enlarges the government. Latin America was known for rapid de-nationalization and accounted for 55% of total privatization revenues in the developing world by 1999 (Chong and Silantes 2005). Although the Government Dependency Theory is not an economic model, it is important to mention these states because they represent countries like

Estonia that privatized government industries and services and had below average protests during their crises in the 1990s. I do not claim that de-nationalized countries are immune to economic crisis. However, I will demonstrate that even during the shake-up of privatization and economic crisis, decreasing protests occurred in states with small expenditures of GDP on government services (Chong and Silantes 2005).

The Government Dependency Theory has grim predictions for countries that experience mass protests during economic crisis. France, Ukraine, and Syria exemplify the three negative outcomes of protest that I will cover in this paper. France experienced enough protests to dramatically change the course of the country. The people chose a candidate who promised to forego austerity in favor of taxing the rich in order to fund continued services. This was a somewhat peaceful and democratic means of deposing the government. Despite choosing new leadership, conflict continues. This is the main aftershock that my theory predicts. The unified voice heard in the plazas protested the government's mismanagement of the country. However, the movement's unspoken message was based on a variety of concerns with a diverse set of models for future success. The Government Dependency Theory predicts that mass protests based on the removal of services have the power to break down a political structure and initiate change. Sadly, that is where the unity ends. The power of mass protests are able to tear down but not rebuild. At the point of rebuilding, the diversity in the crowds cannot agree on the one correct path for the future. Mr. Francois Hollande is already under fire and has the worst approval rating of every other French president in the modern times.

Ukraine is still piecing together what remains of its country after overthrowing its government. In February 2014, protesters responded to the failed EU bailout deal that promised the delivery of modern social services. The diverse masses united against the government and

called for the leadership to step down. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled the capital, creating a power vacuum. While the government reassembled its components, crisis profiteers took advantage of the situation. Putin used the power vacuum, crisis, and diverse masses as an opportunity to spread unrest along cultural lines. The US State Department openly accused Putin of using propaganda to incite violence. Putin claimed Russians in Ukraine were under threat and said that ethnic minorities faced persecution from the new 'fascist' government. Unrest and mass protests in Ukraine preceded cultural cleavages and gave Putin this opportunity. This is a blatant example of how ethnic cleavages are created to start an intrastate war (Logiurato 2014). The conflict is ongoing and an end to the mounting death toll it is uncertain. Protesters are unified until the adversary is overcome. Then, the country will either dwindle in indecision or in Ukraine's case, be subject to culturally instigative rhetoric with deadly outcomes.

Although Syria's anti-government protests did not start because of removal of services, it still is a possible outcome of the Government Dependency Theory. Syria and many other cases like Peru (1983) and Libya (2011) are examples of protests that do not have the resources or support to overcome a violently oppressive government. These protests never overcame the oppressor, and as a result, remain unified against the government. Once deaths occur on either side of the conflict, protesters are reduced to a small group of radicals. This smaller group will claim that the government lost legitimacy when it violently suppressed protests and free speech. These instances encourage a civil war between citizens and the government. Interviews with militants reveal that rebel groups do not have a unified idea of what Syria would look like if they won. This is because the single qualm with the government is what binds them together. If their oppressor were deposed, the country would continue in a state of disruption and lack of direction.

The Government Dependency Theory is similar to Denton Morrison's theory of *Decremental Deprivation* (1971). Morrison's theory is a variation of *Relative Deprivation* and claims that unrest is likely to occur when people believe that an entity or circumstance has suddenly reduced their opportunities. When a person compares his present life with the quality of life that once was, joining a mass movement becomes a last ditch effort to rectify perceived injustice (Locher 2001).


Morrison lists factors of *Decremental Deprivation* that do not completely agree with the Government Dependency Theory. In Morrison's first and second factors, he requires protest movements be comprised of a socially similar group from within a larger rigid class system. This would not apply to my theory because mass protests concerning this paper are so large that they cross segments of socioeconomic status. The sheer size of protests in Ukraine, Greece, and France guaranteed diversity of classes, ethnicities, and religions. The diversity present in those protests, as shown in protest polls, is explained by one linking aspect – the role of government as a provider. Large groups of people similarly victimized by the government serve as the social similarity that Morrison requires to make protests possible (Locher 2001).

Morrison also requires proximity and communication between protest participants. I take issue with this point to a certain degree. My theory argues that people had a personal feeling of injustice that drove them into the streets. I believe the media successfully filled Morrison's requirement by communicating the protests to similarly affected citizens. The third affect requires a highly involved voluntary association activity paired with a unified message. As discussed earlier, polls show that protesters were not affiliated with a political party or organized by an NGO. My theory claims that the lack of a unified message is what draws protesters in record numbers. The "anti-government" message was simple and was something that everyone

could support. Anything more specific would have reduced participants disinterested in a narrow message that did not apply to them. The lack of a political affiliate is what makes protests during economic crises so destructive. The protests covered in this thesis have only the unity and energy to tear down; they do not have the organization or leadership to rebuild during a coup's power vacuum. A political affiliate was not seen in Ukraine's most recent economic crisis and is an unnecessary factor to successful mass protests (Locher 2001).

Global Level research of the Government Dependency Theory begins with economic crisis as a control and uses the percentage of GDP spent on services as the dependent variable. This accentuates a connection to the rate of increased or decreased protests. I use the World Bank's database of banking crises from 1979 to 2013 to create a sample set of economic crises. Economic crisis is difficult to define. Portions of state budgets can be in relative crisis at any given time without affecting public services. I use banking crisis because it is usually the first sign of economic trouble, shows a measurable level of crisis, and is a direct threat to the liquidity needed to pay for public services. The GDELT database is how I measure the occurrence of protests in a given country and year. I record the average number of protests during every non-crisis year to serve as a baseline for the country. Then I compare this baseline to the number of protests that occurred in the country during the years of economic crisis.

The World Bank's database accumulates countries that reach a specified threshold to economic crisis to invoke policies of austerity and reform. This specific threshold of crisis is important because it shows that all of these countries can be compared with one another based on the financial trouble of their banking system. I conclude that states that spent more on social services experienced an increase in protests during economic crises. Figure 9 shows that as the




Source: GDELT 2014; Leaven and Valencia 2012

Table 2

% of GDP	Decreasing protests	Increasing Protests
0% - 5%	1.00%	0.00%
6% - 10%	0.95%	0.05%
11% - 15%	0.81%	0.19%
16% - 20%	0.94%	0.06%
21% - 25%	0.53%	0.47%
26% - 30%	0.45%	0.55%
31% - 35%	0.50%	0.50%
36% - 40%	0.00%	1.00%
41% - 45%	0.00%	1.00%
46% - 50%	0.00%	1.00%
51% - 55%	0.00%	1.00%

Source: GDELT 2014; Leaven and Valencia 2012



Source: GDELT 2014; Leaven and Valencia 2012

percentage of GDP expenditure rises, so does the likelihood of increasing protests in the majority of the 147 cases of banking crises (GDELT 2014; Leaven and Valencia 2012). The Government Dependency Theory not only shows a positive relationship between higher GDP expenditure on services and protests; it also shows that a lower GDP expenditure causes a reduction in protests. With further study, a country could reference Figure 10 and Table 2 to determine the likelihood of protests during a banking crisis based on historical data. For example, if a country spends 21% to 35% of GDP on services, it has roughly a 50% chance of protests. Whereas if a country spends more than 36% on government services, it has 100% likelihood that it will experience increased protests. (GDELT 2014; Leaven and Valencia 2012).


The opposite end of the spending spectrum promises relative safety from protests. Countries spending 12% or less on social services only had a .03% chance of increased protests. Of countries spending 20% of GDP or less on services, only 11% increased their protests. Figure 10 shows that spending at 0% - 25% will result in a gradual increase in the likelihood of protests while spending at 25% - 55% will result in a sharp incline in the likelihood of protests. This sharp increase represents the society's breaking point for government dependence. When offering more than 34% of GDP on services, countries have a 100% chance of increased protests.

This data can provide priceless information for nations on the brink of economic crisis. Police aware of ensuing protests could train officers in riot procedures, cancel police holidays, purchase proper riot gear, and monitor the flow of illegal arms on the black market. Politicians could quickly negotiate with protesters, restrict the powers of unions, and reduce hate speech that causes cleavages. In the long-term, governments could find a way to streamline government

services, cut budgets while improving quality, and public goods. My goal in this section is to highlight my database's importance; I cover in-depth policy implications in a later chapter.

The book *Public Sector Shock* concentrates on European countries experiencing a removal or “shock” to their public services and it supports the *State Level* of the Government Dependency Theory. In order for my theory to work, dependence on government services should be established. This in-depth European study claims, “The public sector has always been considered a cornerstone of European societies and, as such, also an essential lever for economic growth and political stability” (Vaughan-Whitehead 2013). The study goes on to state that because the public sector is so intimately connected to the European economy, the security of public service budgets is highly dependent on economic problems out of the state's control. The 2009 economic crisis shocked the public sector into a wave of austerity adjustments unprecedented in their pace, scale, and scope. Because the government has a monopoly on public services, the people protest when crises threatens the wide-ranging benefits offered. Interestingly, the protests occurred before the population felt any actual side effects in service quality or in quantity of goods. This suggests that the connection to social services is so strong in some states that the very threat of their removal causes universal feelings of injustice, betrayal, and insecurities concerning food, housing, and health (Sitek 2008).

Figure 11 Protest % Increase



Source: GDELT 2014


States with smaller governments have a segregated workforce with unions having little power during negotiations. The salaries of Greece's 700,000 government employees consisted of 22% of GDP in 2009 (Kyriakidou 2012). This relatively small but powerful demographic of government employees was the first affected by austerity measures and protested in response. Small governments employ less people and control the size of unions to maintain an advantage during negotiations (Vaughan-Whitehead 2013). Unchecked special interest groups force the government to make policy decisions that are not in the state's best long-term interest. Countries with some of the highest government employed percentages are Denmark (29.7%), Sweden (34%), France (21.8%), Slovenia (14.3%), and Hungary (20.4%). These states also have some of the largest increases in protests compared to non-crisis years. The increased protest rates of Denmark (510%), Sweden (436%), France (67%), Slovenia (173%), and Hungary (100%) are partially due to the number of employees affected by pay cuts, pension reductions, and layoffs during

economic crises (GDELT 2014; OECD 2011).

Polls enable me to look at the government-civilian relationship and track the dependency on government services on the *Community Level*. Figure 11 compares the number of protests in the countries with increased demonstrations. Pew Polls show that countries with the highest increase in protests are those with a citizenship in favor of a large government system with guaranteed safety nets. Public opinion polls show only 35% of US citizens said that the state should guarantee that nobody is in need compared to Germany, France, and Spain which poll above 60%. Among US self-identified liberals, only 50% want to see an active role to help the needy. As seen in Figure 11, Europe had some of the highest increases in protests during economic crisis. This means the general European public will mobilize to ensure the continuation of services they believe

in. Conversely, economic crisis in the US barely registers as a significant rise in protests. This means that the public does not display an overwhelming willingness to protect government services from austerity measures. This likely has to do with the small amount of services that

Figure 12 Polls of Crimean Concerns



IRI, USAID, Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization, Rating Group Ukraine CRIMEA RESIDENTS SURVEY, May 2013

the US provides when compared to other nations (Global Attitudes Project 2012; Kohut 2011).

Over 50% of European countries blame the government for the current economic situation, while even more blame the banking industry and its ties to government bailouts (Global Attitudes Project 2012). These numbers support my argument for widespread participation in antigovernment-movements. Although poll participants have different reasons for disliking the government, their collective distaste is universal because of the state's scope and sprawl in their society. Polls reflect community opinions and identify drivers. This feedback is a vital aspect to my research and confirms my hypothesis.

USAID polls conducted in the spring of 2013 listed the concerns of Crimean citizens by importance. Of the 19 issues, 15 were government responsibilities like healthcare, housing, corruption, social protection, pension payments, and the economy. These results contradict previously cited protest theories by showing that interethnic relations were rated least important in May 2013. As seen in Figure 12, only two people in the study were personally affected by ethnic tensions. These numbers are low for a region that supposedly separated based on interethnic relations ten months after the study. The overwhelming majority of citizens were unsatisfied with the government in some capacity. Citizens in a state with outsourced services would not identify with antigovernment protests because the state only plays a small role in their daily lives.

A common criticism of political science is that it has a broad vantage point and uses statistics to draw conclusions concerning complex situations. To counter this perspective, the Government Dependency Theory gains personal perspectives from experts in the field who have had careers dealing with the cultures and issues at hand. Mary Hussmann is a recently retired lead organizer for Grass Roots Organizing (GRO), whose mission statement includes, "Creating

a grassroots voice to win economic justice and human rights for all Missourians” (Krewson 2011). Both the Missouri Senate and the House of Representatives has recognized her organizing efforts in voter registration, low income housing, and Medicaid/Medicare. She coordinated and participated in numerous protests and offers an indispensable perspective to the Government Dependency Theory (Krewson 2011).

Interviews with Hussmann uncovered many subtleties about protests that were not discussed in academic works. Hussmann’s perspective matches the Government Dependency Theory on four key aspects:

- 1) Movements are more powerful when the issue affects diverse and numerous citizens
- 2) Hope mobilizes protesters
- 3) Injustice instills people with a need to “do something”
- 4) It is difficult to distinguish between political and corporate protests because grievances are aimed at multiple diverse parties

Hussmann stated pragmatically that issues affecting large and diverse portions of society attract much more support than issues affecting a minority of citizens. She contrasted a project of delaying the eviction of a mobile home community with her fight against Social Security and Medicare cuts. There was limited support for the victims of mobile home evictions because the problem affected so few. Because these were largely non-voting citizens, politicians had to be convinced that it was politically beneficial to fight this injustice. This issue was championed by a single politician but ended up going to the courts for resolution. Referencing the flow chart on page 31, this is an example of “Public with Diverse Sources of Hardship - No Protests.”

Gaining support was difficult because too few people were affected by the perceived injustice,

and the government was not leveraged by mass protests to change its decision to allow the evictions.

Social issues like Social Security and Medicare gained massive support because they affect the vast majority of US citizens. Hussmann stated that Social Security and Medicare provided services for everyone from Ronald Reagan to the retirees who signed petitions at her GRO booth. Even the younger generations participated in protests because they saw how these services kept a large generation of baby boomers (their parents) independent and out of their children's basements. I believe that participants were also concerned with how cuts would affect their eventual retirements supplemented by Social Security and Medicare. Hussmann said that issues affecting this many people on a personal level gathered large crowds to protest, and she did less organizing to increase participation and more accurately "rode the wave" of the movement. This is a key finding in the Government Dependency Theory. Issues that affect few people need organizations to drum up support, and assist with legislature and the courts because they lack popular appeal. However, when an issue affects so many people, the cause drives itself and organizations are along for the ride. The protesters in Ukraine, Greece, and France are similarly categorized. Polls of protest participants show no affiliation with any organization, political party, or nationality. They were masses of individuals who simply needed a spark to drive them into the streets.

Hussmann's second point refers to hope as a necessary factor for protests. Individuals need to see an avenue for change; otherwise, they likely succumb to a variety of unsafe options. She has seen groups take many different paths when meeting adversity. Citizens might cave into pressures, act out violently, or burn off steam in the form of peaceful protest. However, all of these acts are fueled by the third aspect -- the sense of injustice (Barclay and Skarlick 2005;

Woods 2012). Before GRO got involved, Hussmann attended a meeting hosted by the mobile home association threatened by eviction. Unorganized by a non-profit, the group had a minority of “hot-heads” that boasted they would defend their property by any means necessary. Hussmann doubted it would ever get to a violent stage. However, she does believe that with the extent of perceived injustice and the lack of viable options, the situation was a pressure cooker whose energy could be displaced in unhealthy ways. The Government Dependency Theory claims that if a movement does not get mass support, violence from a radical minority is a possible outcome. However, in the case of economic crises, antigovernment protests gained more than enough support to influence policy. The spark of hope was the accumulation of protesters in the plaza; citizens demonstrating on the issues that affected the vast majority increased protests to numbers unseen in history.

The fourth required aspect claims small government systems make it harder to determine whom to protest against. When Hussmann organized against high interest loans offered by the payday bank loan companies, victims did not know whether to blame the corporations for the high rates of lending or the government for allowing it. If the government were to increase its size and responsibility by supplying payday loans at the high interest rates, they would experience protests in outrage. Similarly, if the government provided quality low interest loans and then threatened to take them away, they would also experience protests. Protesters with these complaints would join a large and diverse population that is disgruntled with the government for different reasons. By allowing the markets to provide this service, the government commits an injustice of omission and not commission. These two scenarios differ drastically in their media coverage and the resulting protesters willing to mobilize for the cause.

Consulting Mary Hussmann gives this thesis an in-depth perspective on the individual level of the Government Dependency Theory. However, our ideologies did not exactly mesh. For example, Hussmann believes that more government services are needed to support its citizens needs of education, food, and shelter security. The Government Dependency Theory argues against expanding programs because of the attention it brings from a collectively disgruntled populous. My theory acknowledges the need for social services, but argues they should be privatized or consist of less than 20% of GDP expenditure. She also believes that private organizations like food pantries and churches, although helpful, could never match the quality and reliability of government programs like food stamps. Again, my theory is not a social policy; my theory is a method that would be successful in reducing protests during economic crises. These disagreements are relatively inconsequential to the expertise provided on protests and grassroots organizing.

IV. CASE STUDIES

State Level research of Ukraine, Estonia, Hungary, and Peru shows citizens' dependency on the state can cause different cultures, nations, and governments to experience protests. I will first compare the economic crisis in Estonia and Ukraine. These countries have similar population demographics, dates of independence, and histories under communist rule. Conversely, these two states differ on the paths chosen after their independence. While Ukraine chose increased social services and government overreach, Estonia enacted radical privatization reforms that reduced the size of its government. This thesis claims the divergent paths taken is the reason Estonia experienced a reduction in protests while Ukraine had increased protests during its economic crises. I then compare the economic crises in Hungary and Peru individually. Both of these states had two economic crises with varying degrees of protest numbers. My theory uses this anomaly to explain how two crises in the same state can produce differing degrees of protests. This information will elaborate on the trends of my global database by displaying their applicability on the *State Level* of study.

IV – I. UKRAINE AND ESTONIA

The Government Dependency Theory was inspired by the Ukrainian coup that was brought on by protests in late 2014. The difference between Ukraine and Estonia begins with the paths taken after independence. Prior to their independence in the early 90s, the USSR ruled these countries with a command economy. The command economy relies on the government for production, investment, price setting, and incomes. I blame this centralized control for creating government sprawl and a culture of dependence. "Communism created structural incentives for engaging in corrupt behaviors, which became such a widespread fact of life that they became

rooted in the culture in these societies.” (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005). The command system encouraged large and inefficient governments to overspend without repercussion. This is because governments owned industries, monopolized production, and controlled the means of regulation (Hopkin, Rodriguez, and Pose 2007; Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005).

The path taken after independence displayed Ukraine’s dedication to central governance. When it seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly elected government nationalized former USSR assets and continued their operation. Ukraine doubled down on socialist policies and increased citizens’ legal rights and accessibility to public goods. Its inefficient programs continued without any reform or review of the inherited communist system. An unfocused dispersion of guaranteed goods created a population whose demand for and reliance on government services has increased since Ukraine’s independence in 1991 (Monastyrski 2004; Ukraine.com 2014).

Ukraine dodged the 2009 economic crisis by continuing public services with help from an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. However, continued spending on inefficient social goods plunged the country into another case of economic trouble in 2013. The IMF refused Ukraine’s second request for a bailout, citing a failure to streamline, cut, and reform its social service programs (Garanich 2013). Creditors called in their debts and pensions went unpaid. Civilians were at risk of freezing in the coming winter. Ukraine’s energy policy requires the government to pay 7% of GDP for residential gas subsidies for heat and cooking while citizens pay a mere 20% of the actual cost (The World Bank 2013). Mass protests littered Ukrainian plazas. Russia responsively offered an aid package worth \$15 billion in new loans and \$3 billion in debt relief. The Ukrainian government used this money and doubled down on public goods in order to pacify protesters. This announcement coincided with a lull in political mobilizations.

Protesters were satisfied until the relief plan deteriorated when Russia's energy giant Gazprom called in Ukraine's \$7 billion debt, placing Ukraine in default on payments. The citizens witnessed the loss of an IMF, EU, and a Russian bailout all within a few months. Responsively, rioters took to the streets again in protest until the successful coup on February 22, 2014 (Petroff 2014). The lack of alternative economic options threatened the civilian's sense of security -- security based solely on the government's success.

Ukrainian demonstrations in 2014 had similarities to mass protests around the world. Polls show that protesters' had diverse concerns, proposed solutions, and ideologies and were not unified by a specific message. Protesters gathered because they were each individually affected by the economic crisis when existing services were threatened. Ukraine spent over 41% of GDP on government services before its coup in 2014. By referencing Table 2 on page 31, Ukraine's government expenditure placed it at a 100% risk of experiencing increased protests during crisis. Knowing this information before the coup could have informed policy, prepped riot police, and persuaded officials to negotiate with protesters in the plaza.

It is necessary to demonstrate a need-based relationship between the Ukrainian populations and their government for this theory to work. A 2005 survey of Ukrainian teenagers sought to determine the needs, wants, and concerns for the future of their community. The results were predominantly in favor of public services with the environment coming in a distant second. These statistics are particularly relevant because they show the mindset of Ukrainians in their formative years. Teenagers who took this survey in 200 possibly took part in the protests on February 22, 2014 (Nikolayenko 2011).

Lewis H. Siegelbaum is a Russian and European History professor at Michigan State University who contributed a valued perspective to this paper during our interview. He is a

history expert of labor, consumption, and material culture in the Soviet Union, covering the Stalin era to the late Soviet period. His book, *Making Workers Soviet: Power Class and Identity*, was also an excellent reference used to understand the mindset of the Soviet working class. This book and our interview confirmed the ideology of the government as a provider and the connection between poor services and protests in Ukraine.

Dr. Siegelbaum quickly confirmed the relationship between Soviet style governance and the population's expectation of services. "Public expectations have a great deal to do with the degree of resignation or protest that people experience... People associate the state with certain functions, they are going to expect those to continue or for those functions to be provided otherwise or no less so." His book describes the relationship between the government and the people as a social contract, that when broken, causes the government to lose legitimacy. During the Soviet rule, citizens spoke out about the lack of heat, bread, and services. These were neutral non-political complaints, keeping protesters safe from government backlash. However, the lack of social services provided by the government was a political failure and was bigger than the protesters' simple message of food security. Because of the advancements of a freer media and democratic society, there is less fear of brutal communist crackdowns on political confrontation and protests (Siegelbaum and Suny 1994).

Compared to Soviet years, modern Ukrainian protesters blame the true political causes for removing services. They blame corruption, inefficiency, strict austerity measures, international encroachment, and global economic dealings. The message from protesters in socialist states changed from complaining about bread to complaining about politics in the past 100 years. However, the root cause of protests stayed the same. The socialist government broke

the social contract to provide public services for its citizens. This was the cause of Ukrainian protests during the economic crisis of 2013-2014.

Dr. Seiglebaum disagrees with some aspects of my theory's application to the Ukrainian case. Seiglebaum observes a global shift towards "neoliberalism" – a system that privatizes and lowers regulations. Because of the transition to the market system in the 1990s and 2000s, capitalist markets are in place and nationalization cannot be blamed for protests. He also claims that even though Ukraine has a system of communist-style provisions, these government-delivered services are dysfunctional and would not likely create dependency. In his opinion, "the services expected were not getting to where they were needed." Both of these points are valid and objectively considered while constructing my theory (Siegelbaum and Suny 1994).

The IMF and EU push neoliberal reforms paired with austerity measures to rebalance state economies under stress. However, transitions to true market economies are slow and often remain incomplete. During industrial privatization, some governments choose to keep a residual share of the company. This is because the government hopes the company will become profitable after privatization and provide a return on the investment. More often, a country chooses to hold residual shares for the intended purpose of influencing future governance of divested companies (Lieberman 2008). Industrial Ownership accompanies high GDP expenditures. In turn, expectations of the government continue to involve stabilizing markets, subsidizing materials, and regulating industries. The bailouts for the financial markets, EU governments, and large industries are examples of state interference acting on Socialist ideologies. A capitalist economy allows a bank approaching bankruptcy to sell off assets to reimburse its customers' losses. True capitalist economies that go into debt do not inflict massive shocks to the daily lives of its citizens (Friedman 1980). Socialist governments hold on to the nationalization of production and

delivery of health, home, and employment, causing a larger reaction from populations when they fail to uphold the social agreement inherited by industry ownership.

Dr. Seigelbaum's comment of Ukrainian services being too poor in quality to create dependence is a valid critique and should be considered on a case by case basis. Data shows that Ukraine broadly administers services to citizens in need but also to those manipulating the system to their benefit. "Almost 40 percent of the recipients of assistance for the poor- that aim to maintain a minimum income for neediest population groups – are non-poor households" (Poliakova and Reut 2009). The middle class uses government services to subsidize incomes while the genuine poor use the system for life saving healthcare, welfare, and pensions. The public relies on the misuse and use of the system to maintain their current quality of life (Poliakova and Rent 2008). In 2013, when Ukrainian services were threatened after the \$15 billion Russian bailout deal fell through, citizens in every social class thought it unreasonable to pay out of pocket for energy, housing, healthcare, childcare, and care for their elderly parents (Social Security Programs Through the World: Ukraine 2013). This shock occurred during economic crisis; a time when the government was required to provide a safety net for its citizens. In their minds, the government did not uphold its end of the social bargain. This inefficiency of benefit delivery is in the Government Dependency Theory's favor. Ukraine's failure to target only the poor spread benefits to everyone, linking citizens together in a common dependency. Successful countries reformed, reduced government dependence, and weathered the economic controversies without protests.

Estonia began austerity measures and reduced its population's reliance on public services during its transition to independence in 1991 (Parts 2013; Simon 2012). Estonia, like Ukraine, was a centrally planned and government managed country since the 1920s. The population was

accustomed to Soviet public services blanketing the entire population. Estonia started its transition to the market economy and independent currency in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev acceded power. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Estonia lost it as the consumer of 90% of its foreign trade and experienced an economic crisis. Soviet banks that had previously extended favorable loans to Estonia also broke their ties. These shocks to the economy made Estonia lose 25% of its real GDP from 1991 to 1992. Estonia hurriedly completed its transition to the market system. The country became known for its strict transition from Soviet-style communism to Friedmanism. This heavily capitalistic model of reform originated as a variation of Milton Friedman's Nobel Prize winning economic theory that requires a small hands-off government to allow an "Invisible Hand" to control the markets (Knoble et al 2002; Staehr 2012).

European countries incurred foreign debts to maintain their welfare programs while Estonia tightened the budget and privatized remaining government services. Shortly after, Estonia's private sector became 75% of GDP. The country also tied its currency to the German Mark, denying the government interference with currency devaluation during crises. The transition was not easy; domestic banks often denied the government's request for loans. Fears arose that the government, being fed up with loan denials, would nationalize the banks and guarantee continued funding. This, however, never happened because of the continued commitment to a market economy (Knobl et al 2002). Even with the possibility of a bankrupt government, there was a 12.6% decline in protests during the 1992 economic crisis (GDELT 2014).

Estonia has continued a privatized, sleek, and government-free economy since its first banking crisis in 1992. Estonia's 2009 economic crisis did not make it into the World Bank's banking crises database. Estonia cut budgets and consolidated surpluses into emergency reserves

during boom years and did not suffer the lack of bank liquidity that the World Bank database required. However, it did cut social expenditure during the 2009 economic crisis and experienced a decrease in political protests (Vaughan-Whitehead 2013). Similar to Ukraine, the 2009 global economic crisis hit Estonia hard. GDP decreased 17% and foreign currency loans reached a total of 80% while its lenders called in debts. Estonia consolidated two thirds of its budget in 2009 by concentrating reductions on government expenditure. The country cut the healthcare budget 8% while limiting pensions, defense spending, and farming subsidies (Parts 2013). Unlike Ukraine, Estonia simplified taxation, privatized government structures, and reduced public services, allowing it to cut spending and adjust nominal wages. Austerity measures decreased its already limited public sector wages, raised the pension age, and made it difficult to claim health benefits (Anderson and Romani 2005).

Estonia employed the 4C's program which 1) Challenges the need for the service, 2) Compares performance with private providers, 3) Consults with the taxpayer, and 4) Competes in the market to stay profitable. This program restricts government officials to only provide public services to its population in the most effective and efficient ways possible. The 4C's privatized numerous government services and displaced the duties and responsibilities to competent corporations. Estonia applied this process to pensions, health care, public transportation, and numerous other markets (Tonnison Wilson 2007). My research attributes Estonia's success to three things: 1) Reduced government interaction with the markets, 2) Reduced and privatized social services, and 3) Diversified economies by attracting private investment.

Even after Estonia's punitive measures, citizens re-elected the administration that brought them through the 2009 crisis. It is the only Eurozone country with a budget surplus; it spends a

mere 17% of GDP on its combined social services programs, which is the lowest of any EU country (Raudla 2013). Estonia's business model of cutting and restructuring social services allowed it to survive the Russian economic downturn in 1992, structured it to thrive during the 2009 global financial crisis, and prepared it to weather economic crises yet to come (Parts 2013).

Ukraine and Estonia set out on vastly different paths upon their independence. Those paths affected their future tolerance of economic crisis. Ukraine sought an opportunity to incur debt in order to avoid the risks of reform. Protests in Ukraine turned violent when the government was unable to support the population that relied heavily on its services. "[W]hen individuals feel outward-focused negative emotions in response to perceived violations, these emotions can increase their need to right a wrong or engage in retaliatory behaviors" (Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh 2005). Government incompetence threatened Ukrainians' right to public services and their way of life; this injustice caused feelings of anger, hostility, and retaliation with only the government to blame (Barclay and Skarlicki 2005; Woods 2012).

IV – II. HUNGARY

Critics of comparative case studies dwell on state differences, claiming that no two countries are the same. Each country has its own cultural cleavages, political history, and relationship between people and the state. Even though Estonia and Ukraine have similar populations, histories of independence, and severity of economic crisis, differences between states can affect comparisons. In light of this fact, the Government Dependency Theory seeks out states experiencing two banking crises with differing results in protests. By doing this, I am able to compare the same people, heritage, history, and political systems. Hungary is the best example of this effect. Hungary had a banking crisis from 1991 to 1995 and experienced a 66.4% decrease in protests compared to non-crisis years. Hungary again experienced an economic crisis lasting

from 2008 to the present. During the second crisis, protests increased 100%. Determining what changed between these two events could bolster or contradict my thesis.

Hungary started economic and political reforms after it gained its independence from the USSR in 1988. In 1990, elected officials reformed financial institutions, tax rates, free markets, and social benefits. The rapid transition to marketization continued as the 1991- 1995 economic crisis hit. A subsequent administration doubled down on economic reforms and cut public spending to control the state's foreign debts. By 1997, the public sector deficit decreased to 4.6%. By the mid 1990s, 80% of GDP was produced by the private sector with large portions of the economy made profitable by foreign ownership. Hungary had used privatization to withstand the crisis and bring its GDP growth to 4.4% in 1997. During this crisis, Hungary spent 10.6% of GDP on government expenditure and experienced a 66.4% reduction in the occurrence of protests. However, it was not long before political influences started tapping into this newly found GDP growth.

Peter Gedeon (2004) claims that Hungary's unique political party system increased government overreach and public services beginning in the late 1990s. The political parties in Hungary are malleable, allowing candidates to mobilize large numbers of swing voters and multiple demographics. Politicians took advantage of this affect by promising increased public services in exchange for easily swayed voter support. Newly elected coalitions solely attributed their win to the promise of higher wages and social services. Politicians easily mobilized voters due to a lack of party politics. Alternatively, other countries like the United States have large masses of entrenched citizens that vote along party lines and have not historically voted based on promised social benefits. From 1998 – 2008, Hungary's political system increased GDP expenditures, public services, foreign debt, and dependency on government services. The

reforms of the late 1990s promised social benefits while claiming that civilians would directly contribute to their own care. However, when elections were close, politicians never transitioned to a self-sustaining public system for fear of fickle voter backlash. Instead, the state became bigger and took on additional debts to provide promised services (Ferge 1990).

In 1996, Hungary finished the first superhighway built by a private company in a post-communist country. This ambitious project supposedly signified Hungary's commitment to privatization, a market economy, and a reversal of the country's communist past. The project hit a roadblock soon after its inauguration when drivers realized they had to pay a toll to use the road. After a public outcry, the government required the company to lower its toll cost. The government then subsidized the difference in the company's profits. Citizens were happy with this result, even knowing that the government was covering the deficit. Hungarian citizens in the late 1990s were increasingly comfortable with industries operating at a loss, and that those losses should be socialized through the state budget (Bokros and Detheir 1998).

In 1997, Hungary's Prime Minister announced that retirees over the age of 64 would travel for free on the national airline. Subsidizing the airline would be covered by revenue garnered from an economic recovery that was proceeding better than expected. Although it was well known that this was a voter buyoff for the older demographic, it was accepted with few complaints. Hungary's politically influenced social services resulted in incompetent elected officials who wasted government funds and increased government dependency (Bokros Deithier 1998). Subsequent political administrations pacified citizens by paying for services promised on the campaign trail (Bokros and Deithier 1998). By 2008, citizens' contributions to pensions were not enough to sustain the system, causing the government to use 10% of GDP to cover the deficit (Benyik 2009). In the time between the 1991 and 2008 crises, Hungary's expenditure grew from

10.6% of GDP to 45%, drastically increasing the population's dependence on the government. Hungary had good intentions to transition to a market economy and privatize social services but later became a victim of politicized government expansion (Gedeon 2004).

The Hungarian government maintained the purse strings to its universal healthcare system into the new millennium. Like the benefits of childcare, unemployment, social security, pensions, housing, and income redistribution, the healthcare program was designed to be self-sufficient and dependent on the free market system. However, collecting taxes from the populous became problematic because of an increasing mindset that it was the government's role to provide free benefits for its people (Bokros and Deithier 1998; World Bank 2012). Foreign loans from Austria and Italy propped up Hungary's public services, amounting to 100% of GDP (Peston 2012). In response to the 2008 economic crisis, Hungary aggressively reduced its public education, sick pay, family allowance, maternity pay, pension, housing subsidy, gas/heat compensation, and social security budgets. Like other European countries, it abolished exemptions for low wage earners (Syndicat European Trade Union 2011). Hungary's services were threatened, causing a 100% increase in protests.

Hungary's economic crises in 1991 and 2008 both caused drastic reductions of services. By the time the 1991 crisis was over, the real value of welfare expenditures decreased by 35%. The universally provided welfare services also dropped over 12% (Orosz 2014). Because it did not gain a dependency on government services until the 2000s, country reduced its protests by 66.4%. Hungary's population slowly became dependent on the government because politicians bought votes with increasing coverage and quality of services. This resulted in a 100% increase in protests during the 2008 crisis (Peston 2012).

IV – III. PERU

Nils Jacobsen is a historian specializing in the history of Peru whose interview for this thesis provided priceless insights into the history and mentality of Peruvians. He has authored many books on Latin America and Peru and easily applied his historical knowledge to the effects of social welfare in South America. Peru experienced one banking crisis during the scope of this thesis, in 1983. This crisis resulted in a 59.6% reduction of protests (GDELT 2014; Laeven and Valencia 2012). This paper will compare this event to Peru's economic crisis of 1975 when protests gave the military an opportunity to carry out a coup. Although the earlier crisis is outside of the scope of my study, it is a valid event that contributes to this thesis.

Dr. Jacobsen said that in a general way Peru is a different political culture from other states, in that civilians expect *oberas* -- public works from its government. He pinpointed a period of increased government size and scope during Juan Velasco Alvarado's military administration (1968-1975). After taking office in 1968, Valasco consolidated his power. He nationalized the American oil company, enacted price controls, restricted foreign exchange markets, assembled a staff of military confidants, and increased government powers. The military administration prided itself on inward focusing and statist ideals rather than FDI and foreign imports (Kruijt 1994). This ideology instigated the government ownership of the mining, communications, fishing, banking, and agricultural industries (Weeks 1976).

Velasco's administration attempted to politically mobilize sections of the economy that previously did not have a voice. He empowered unions to pool resources and made it difficult to fire industrial workers. Local government structures encouraged rural areas to be politically active. To strengthen this newly created political base, the government granted land to rural farmers, promoted cooperatives, and introduced subsidies for oil, gasoline, and basic staple

foods. While, pandering to this new demographic, Velasco continued wide-ranging benefits for upper and middle classes as well. This became the regime's undoing. By giving increased public goods, land grants, and a political voice to all classes, it created a dependent society. "Demands made by these communities typically are not demands on third parties that the state can mediate but rather direct demands on the state itself" (Roert 1986; Stokes 1994). As previously stated, when the state replaces employers and unions the people have no other option than to confront the government directly when they perceive injustice.

Organizations and employers have a healthier connection to the worker because these entities value the population's daily contribution, whereas the government only needs citizens' support during times of political upheaval or election (Roert1986; Stokes 1994; Thorp and Bertram 1978). Velasco's reforms threw the economy into crisis by spending almost 20% of GDP while incurring huge deficits to fund the expansion of government. During this time, the private sector share of total investment reached its lowest point in the country's history (Carranza, 2001). In the mid 1970's the people mobilized in protest against the government. Strikes were prevalent and the troubled economy worsened.

Figure 13 <i>UNEMPLOYMENT AND STRIKES IN PERU, 1967-1975</i>				
<i>Year</i>	<i>Unemployment Rate, national</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Strikes Hours Lost (000's)</i>	<i>Aver. Length of strikes (000's of hours)</i>
1967	3.2%	414	8373	20.2
1968	4.0	364	3378	9.3
1969	5.9	372	3889	10.4
1970	4.7	345	5782	16.8
1971	4.4	377	10882	28.9
1972	4.2	409	6331	15.4
1973	4.2	788	15689	19.9
1974	4.0	562	12101	21.5
1974	N.A.	591*	N.A.	N.A.
*First eight months of the year only.				


As seen in Figure 13, the occurrence of protests increased from an average 52 per year to 591 in the first eight months of 1974. Velasco's reforms of 1968-1975 increased government provided goods for a broad base of constituents in order to gain their support during political upheaval. However, because of the debt that threatened those public goods, that voter base turned on him and the military was able to conduct a coup without resistance from the public (Garzon and Wilson 2003; Weeks 1976).

After the Velasco administration, the state went through a difficult transition as it cut budgets and regained control of deficits. Protests raged, and at times, the government violently suppressed and imprisoned protesters. After the violence of transition was over the administration experienced a second economic crisis in 1983 with drastically different reactions from protesters. In the time between the coup of 1975 and the 1983 economic crisis, the government drastically reduced subsidies and dismantled social reforms. Free market strategies took precedence and the government expenditure was reduced to 11% of GDP. Investment in the private sector rose to 86% from 62%. During this time, the economy worsened; GDP growth dropped to 1.23% from 2.6% and fell steadily at a rate of .7% per year (Berenguela 1987). Although this crisis inflicted similar hardships to the 1975 crisis, there was a 59.6% reduction in protests in 1983. This was because citizens experienced a clear redirection of the government from pandering to rural voters to trusting free market reforms of public services to pull the country out of the recession.

V. METHODOLOGY

The Government Dependency Theory requires both narrow and broad scopes of study to show how spending on social services creates a dependent populous. Graphs, charts, and international databases are useful tools to display *Global Level* trends while interviews can convey effects felt at the *Individual Level*. From the individual civilian to the macroeconomic perspective, this paper uses methods that focus on multiple levels of study. I utilize all resources available in the pursuit of a diversified defense against skeptics. I interview specialists with local knowledge, weigh data from globally respected databases, reference political science publications, and use qualitative comparisons between case study countries.

The Government Dependency Theory's Layered Research Approach



This thesis uses academic publications to support components of the Government Dependency Theory at the *Theoretical Level*. The connection between protests and the removal of government provided goods during economic crisis was not previously studied. However,

many resources cover different aspects of protests and their causes; my theory compliments or can co-exist with these publications. I limit cited articles and books to those written by experts with extensive knowledge and experience. Professional works often have political preference, mental schema, or personal biases that influence the publication's conclusion. I considered these effects with every source that I use to determine an acceptable level of professionalism and trustworthiness.

The Government Dependency Theory uses IMF and World Bank databases to display global level correlations. The data is trustworthy and the measures used pertain to the issue of government dependence. Because I am the originator of this theory, I collect and compare raw protest and GDP expenditure data from these global organizations to make a unique argument. I average the number of protests in a state and its government expenditure on services in a sample set of 147 instances of banking crises. Datasets show *Global Level* trends between the removal of social services and protests around the world.

Comparative case studies of four countries during economic crisis developed the Government Dependency Theory's *State Level* analysis. This level of analysis is invaluable when determining the government's social contract with its people. While studying Ukraine's destructive protests in 2013-2014, the government removed the life-sustaining goods on which the people were dependent. After applying this model to the capitalistic economic crisis of Estonia, the outcome was vaguely predictable. During my research, Estonia continued to emerge as a country that took the opposite approach to social services as Ukraine and experienced no unrest or protests during its economic crises. These Eastern European countries have similar backgrounds and government structures, allowing me to research an unaltered real-world

example. The weaknesses of this method are that no two countries are alike; internal cultural differences that would impede comparison might not be visible from this broad case study.

Because this study covers over 34 years of statistical research, it allows me to see the same country go through multiple economic crises. Hungary and Peru were very useful in this sense. A country that had two economic crises with two different reactions by protesters provides comparative case studies in the same environment. Countries will have roughly the same demographic, government system, culture, inclination to protest, and exposure to neighboring societies. With these cultural aspects as a constant, I can then look into the variables to see what changed in Hungary to make an decrease in protests during its first economic crisis and an increase during its second economic crisis. This thesis delves deeper to study the individual's culture, language, and mindset on the *Community* and *Individual Levels*.

This paper uses polls to research the *Community Level* of society and its social contract with the government. It is difficult to determine the reason for a protest without experts in the field. In the case of Ukraine, polls help determine the purpose and demographics of protesters. The Government Dependency theory relies on the accurate reporting of polls to determine the psychological reasons for protesting. This confirms the population's elevated needs and expectations of social services. Therefore, polls of Ukrainian dependence on social services and the desire for increasing services is a necessary aspect of the *Community Level* of argument. The weakness of this method is the lack of information. For a definitive look into the community level of the Government Dependency Theory, experts would conduct polls in all 147 cases of economic crisis. Although expansive data is not available, this thesis took advantage of polls measuring Ukraine's connection to social services.

This paper explores the *Individual Level* through interviews to examine the drivers for protests. In-person interviews and personal accounts provide insight into the citizens' thought processes and feelings of injustice. As stated in the first paragraph of this section, bias and source vetting is always a consideration. Personal interviews require the highest level of skepticism. Everyone has a point of view considering politics and the provisions of social services. I incorporate their vantage points in this paper while constantly measuring their level of personal connection with the topic.

Lastly, I use the media to legitimize my sources on all *Five Levels* of study. I cite original sources during the time of protest or economic crisis to get a first-hand and unbiased account. Media articles verify events, places, and groups that involve the topic of economic crises and protests. The weakness of this process is that news from foreign countries is sometimes subject to government editing. Time also degrades the quality and availability of sources. Because I am seeking news coverage of a protest in 1979, articles are not readily available.

This thesis considers everything from *Global Level* statistics to *Individual Level* interviews without finding overwhelming conflicts. I collected and display an array of information not to confuse the reader but to show how simply the Government Dependency Theory can fit among other works in the field and adhere to complex instances of global economic crisis on all levels.

VI. DATA AND MEASURES

The Government Dependency Theory cites 147 carefully vetted cases of economic crisis, occurrence of protests, and percentage of GDP expenditure. This study demands information from a broad range of topics to argue that a correlation and causation relationship exists between social services and protests. I rely on global institutions to define economic crisis while relying on the media to determine the occurrence of protests. With these contributions in place, it is evident that the data and measures are reliable and allow me to glean vital information about the occurrence of protests during economic crises. Because assembling the spreadsheet required over 100 man-hours, I needed to be certain the data used would be uniformly recorded, to scale across the 115 case countries, and locatable with minimal effort. This led me to rely on a list of global banking crises compiled by the IMF, the World Bank's percentage of GDP expenditure, and the GDELT project's occurrence of protests. When data from these services are compared, it creates an accurate and uniform picture of protests during economic crisis.

The IMF's *System Banking Crises Database* is a comprehensive list of systemic banking crises based on two criteria; the signs of distress and policy intervention into the banking system. This list of banking crises was carefully crafted by Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia and is the best list of cases for my study. Economic crisis is difficult to define and measure. "Some evolve gradually, gaining speed as the ripple effects from a seemingly small shock propagate forward in time and through the economy until the effects reach system proportions... Other episodes happen more abruptly and are often the result of a sudden stop" (Laeven and Valencia 2012). I use the IMF's database of banking crises because it is a list of countries that experienced an agreed upon level of crisis. I argue that protests occur in response to the removal or threat of

removal of services. This means I need to determine when the public was aware of a problem to measure its reaction. Banking crisis is the first publicly known effect of economic instability within a state, making it a good measure noticeable by a population. Banking crisis also directly affects the state's ability to continue current levels of GDP expenditures on government services. This paper determines the reaction of the populous when it realizes the severity of the government's financial problems and how they affect services. The IMF database of banking crisis is the best source of information that was conducted accurately, professionally, and with the global and uniform criteria that this study requires.

Measuring the timing of banking crises is an important aspect that allows me to isolate and measure protests and spending data during the years of economic crisis. This requirement excludes many methods of dating crises like credit stock or foreign currency reserves. These methods are slow and do not reflect a timely representation of the economic status felt by the public. The date of banking crisis needs to be accurate because I compare the protests that occur in crisis years vs. the average number of protests during non-crisis years.

To ensure the timing and accuracy of crises, this theory uses the IMF criteria as the main identifier of banking crises. Two identifying criteria have to occur at the same time for the IMF to consider the event as a banking crisis. Those two criteria are:

- 1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations).
- 2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system.

The IMF registers the first year that both of these are met as the beginning of the banking crisis. The IMF's first criteria is essential for the Government Dependency Theory to work. Many

banking crises are squelched by government secrecy or financial assistance before the people are aware of the problem. A crisis of this type would not give a population the opportunity to protest and would not be a worthy banking crisis to study. It is beneficial that the IMF measures banking crisis based on the countries countermeasures as well as significant signs of financial distress. The populous needs to know there is a problem and that their benefits are at risk for the Government Dependency Theory to take effect.

The IMF banking crisis database also requires three of six significant policy interventions to occur for the event to be included in its database. The six policy interventions are:

- 1) Deposit freezes and/or bank holidays
- 2) Significant bank nationalizations
- 3) Bank restructuring gross costs
- 4) Extensive liquidity support
- 5) percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents
- 5) Significant guarantees put in place
- 6) Significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP)

Four of these interventions are commonly used in the banking industry and are not individually specific to crisis, while the policy actions of deposit freezes and bank holidays are used only in a crisis. The combination of early signifiers and specific measures makes the IMF definition of banking crisis aptly suited for this paper.

Although the cases of economic crises have been vetted by experts, the IMF database has weaknesses in its application to this theory. The six policy interventions favor mature economies over emerging ones. Emerging countries are able to conduct bank nationalization and deposit freezes. However, the other policy interventions on the IMF's intervention list require mature


banking institutions and available liquidity to bolster banking systems. Additionally, credit is not often available for emerging countries to purchase assets, guarantee deposits, and cover restructuring costs. This skews the IMF database to include countries that employ these tactics promptly at the first sign of distress. This may cause the Government Dependency Theory to include a disproportional amount of mature economies where these tools are readily available.

A necessary driver of protests is for concerned parties to be aware of crises in a timely manner. This questions a state's communication between the government and its people via landlines, telecommunication coverage, and an ambitious media. Although a country might experience a banking crisis, rural civilians in poorer countries might not receive the news from an unbiased and professional media. Instead, these citizens rely on workers unions, town hall meetings, and word of mouth. This would slow the reaction and number of protests if the crisis were short-lived. These shortcomings are relatively menial when considering the criteria the IMF employed to mitigate errors.

When considering the occurrence of protests, it is important to use raw to incorporate unbiased reporting into this thesis. This study compares the average number of protests during crisis with the baseline number of protests occurring in non-crisis years within a given country. I average the number of protests from 1979 to 2013 excluding crisis years. I then use this baseline to compare the number of protests during crisis years to non-crisis years in the same country. While comparing this baseline protest number to crisis years I am able to determine to what degree the country experienced an increase or decrease in protests.

The Government Dependency Theory requires a database that covered the study's scope of 1979 to 2013 and the 147 cases of global crisis. The most popular form of recording protests is to record the number of reports in the media. I use the improved set of GDELT data to map the occurrence of protests around the world. GDELT data was cited in articles by *Foreign Policy Magazine*, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, and *USAID*. I used the database's award-winning algorithms to search global media sources for protests dating back to 1979. By using the simple search tool I am able to cite trends based on the year they occurred. Searching for one country,

GDELT Protest Blotter Graph




protests, and the years included in my 147 case studies produced two products. The first is a visual display of protests and the amount of press they received, and the second is an excel spreadsheet containing every registered protest.

Figure 14 is a representation of the first product that the GDELT database produces. As seen in to the left, I have highlighted the years of the economic crisis. Grey dots represent protests covered in the media for every

day of a given year. Years are stacked in rows to show annual patterns with the years displayed on the Y axis and the months displayed along the x axis. The different sizes of grey dots represent what percentage of news reports covered the same protest event on a single day.

Therefore, no two dots represent the same event. Bigger grey dots appear if multiple sources and news articles cover the one event. As Figure 15 shows, Ukraine's dotted display of protests and their coverage are misleading. After viewing this graph, one might think that the average number of protests went down during the highlighted crisis years. However, the grey dots occur daily, but are not easily visible. The dots actually show that Ukraine experienced an increased protest rate of 151.8% during the 1996 crisis and 296.4% during the 2014 crisis. Located in the upper

GDELT Protest Blotter Graph Recurring Ukrainian Protests



right corner of Figure 15 there is the visual display of the protests at the end of 2013 that later deposed the president in February of the following year. Although these protests increased in their violence and significance, the coverage of the events decreased in the media creating smaller grey dots as time went on.

The size of the event dots are always smaller during the years of banking crisis. This could be because after reporting on protests for several weeks, the story is less likely to sell and

the media stops covering them in depth. Alternatively, less coverage could be because more pertinent issues of state level crisis are covered instead of reporting on protests. A more paranoid vantage point might claim that the government does not want reporting of protests to flood the media because it scares off foreign investment, rallies more protesters, and reduces trust in the government. Conversely, a country on the graph that seems like a big protest year because of large dark circles usually has a small total number of protests. This is probably because the

protest is a unique event that year, causing it to receive increased coverage. Therefore, I do not use this graph to determine the importance of a protest vs. what it is designed to display - the media coverage the event received.

The IMF database selected the years of crisis, but when considering the effects to potential protesters, I used a wider sample year. Economic crisis might be sudden or develop slowly as stated in the IMF working paper. Similarly, public displays of dissatisfaction usually take time to amass support or take time to subside. For this reason I padded the years highlighted for economic crisis by one year previous and one year following the IMF defined years of crisis. The years surrounding crises are affected by employment, loans, public services, welfare, job retraining, housing, and other government provided goods and can cause protests to be measured. This method had a balancing effect. Whether it is the preceding or post-crisis year, one of these “buffer” years had fewer protests and one had more. Overall, it improved the results to incorporate the years surrounding a crisis.

The GDELT project database also produced a spreadsheet with the data of every occurrence of protest and the percentage of coverage received in the media. With this spreadsheet, I isolate the years of crisis and compare those protests against the average protests in every other year. Many other circumstances incite protests. If the culture uses protests as the primary tool to fight perceived injustice, then the number of protests during a banking crisis will be on average with other years. I only drew conclusions from countries that displayed more than a 20% increase or decrease in protests. Only 15 of the 147 cases of economic crisis had this insignificant amount of rise or fall in the number of protests.

As with most data, human error encompasses most of the weaknesses in the GDELT data. GDELT’s main shortfall is that it restrict its sources and algorithms used to produce the graph

and spreadsheets. Earlier versions of the GDELT project ran into problems with copyright infringement when each event on the spreadsheet or graph had a link to the article or record found by the algorithm. They were forced to remove this link. This caused experts to question if the events occurred and how GDELT located the report. Without publishing the algorithms, GDELT was also accused of using search algorithms that favored western countries when using their online comparison tools. This gave the project a bad name in the academic community. Since then, GDELT closed shop and republished its website with a new set of online tools and algorithms. If a researcher wants to use GDELT data, he has to trust the algorithm found an article or record of protest. Some consider the revised website less trustworthy because of a lack of verification.

The GDELT project relies on a free media to report every instance of protest since 1979. In some areas of the world, it is likely that a free media is not able to report protests that occur in regions inaccessible by modern civilization. In Peru, fringe radicals were violently suppressed during economic crisis of 1983. These conflicts might have started with protests or civil confrontation. However, because of the lack of media coverage these conflicts would not likely be recorded by GDELT. In many authoritarian or communist countries, the government has complete control of the media. Reporting in these countries is more likely to favor the government's perception.

International recognition also could have an effect on the GDELT Project's findings. It is up to GDELT's algorithm to define Eastern European protests preceding their independence in the 1990s. Does the software register the protest event for the Soviet Union or the Ukrainian government? Dissolution of the Soviet Union would not affect any of the countries in my test set during economic crisis years. However, it would certainly lower the baseline average protest

number of every year besides crisis years. The database also does not define what constitutes a state. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bosnia Herzegovina all gained their independence in the early 1990s, but their protest data dates back to 1979. Data would be affected if GDELT attributed protests to Slovenia that actually occurred in the Soviet Union prior to independence. Measuring the protests that occurred in a country that later divided its people, government, and land into two separate states would skew the data. The outcome in countries like Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia would make it seem like a small country develops protests at the rate of a country twice its size.

The percentage of increased/decreased protests compared to the baseline protest number can also be weighted differently from country to country. Countries like Uruguay will show exponential growth in protest numbers during a banking crisis year. In actuality, it makes a relatively small jump from an average seven protests during non-crisis years to thirteen protests during its banking crisis. Although with a 28% government expenditure it correlates with the Government Dependency Theory, this is a relatively small jump in protests that otherwise would not register as a significant increase for this study.

The biggest detractor to GDELT does not lie in the algorithms or with the allegations of copyright fraud, but with the drivers of the protests. GDELT has a tool able to adjust the actions and drivers of the peoples involved in the event. For instance, a researcher can select “armed conflict” under events and choose “government” acting against “civilians.” However, when using this tool, the results were convoluted and scarce. Upon further review, GDELT states that the tool was published and operating but was having problems. The organization suggests finding other means of research to determine the actors and purpose of the event. Therefore, this paper only contains the increase of protests and does not determine if they are anti-government

protests. I mitigate this worry by comparing protest numbers with polls to determine the intent of the masses and its applicability to the theory.

Using the percentage of a country's GDP on expenditures is the most universal and accepted method to measure the size of a government and the extent of its responsibilities. The Government Dependency Theory GDP expenditure as a direct correlation to the role of the government in its citizens lives and the population's dependence on the government. The World Bank data is collected from the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001, harmonized with the 1993 SNA that focuses on economic events affecting asset liabilities, revenues, stock data, and expenses by cash as well as other means. These statistics are on file with the IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, data files, World Bank, and OECD GDP estimates (WorldBank.org). The WB defines this searchable indicator as such:

Expense is cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends.

While conducting this research there is an overwhelming temptation to weigh more data in the equation to solidify the study's results. A researcher might want to isolate spending on health, education, out-of-pocket spending on healthcare, or unemployment welfare. However, these expenditures alone do not measure the Government's all-encompassing involvement in the people's day-to-day lives. As stated in the definition, government expenditure represents not only handouts of the welfare state, but its overall size and relationship with the people. Ukraine's government followed a Soviet-style involvement with its citizens and provides benefits of

energy, health, pensions, unemployment funds, unemployment training, education, transportation, interest on loans, and the wages and salaries for its employees. The expenditure as a percentage of GDP is a great measure of this relationship and sets itself apart from Estonia who privatized those industries.

There are a few weaknesses to the use of percentage of GDP expenditure to measure the government's involvement in its citizen's lives. During my research, I quickly realized that expenditure on goods does not directly relate to the quality of provided goods. Simply because a country spends a fortune, does not mean that the services provided are enough to create government dependency. There are corrupt governments that skim expenditures otherwise meant for the people's goods and services. This complicates but does not irradiate the measurement's usefulness in this project.

The percentage of GDP expenditure does not represent unpaid assistance from volunteer workers and organizations. Doctors without borders, USAID, and the Gates Foundation are just a few organizations that donate millions of dollars to countries in need. These funds are not counted in the country's GDP or its expenditure, yet lifesaving and potentially dependency-creating goods would be provided to a populous. Providing goods and services would also lower GDP if the organization were providing a service that a government would pay an employee to do in its absence. However, this also works with my theory. NGO's usually carry out projects for limited amounts of time and scope. For example, the Gates Foundation conducts a project that improves the infrastructure and access to fresh water. However, because of the limited scope of the project, if something went wrong, few people would complain about do-gooders providing goods and services. Protests challenge that a corporation like the Gates Foundation would not likely gain popular support. In addition, NGOs usually give needy people something they never

had before. The Government Dependency Theory relies on the loss of wide ranging benefits. Therefore, even though GDP expenditure does not bring into account donations of time, money, and materials, it remains the best standard measurement that can be applied to all 147 instances of economic crisis.

The data used in this study was hard to locate and even harder to corroborate. Multiple academic papers used different sources and published varying numbers of GDP expenditure. Some academic papers claimed to use World Bank data. However, the data cited did not match those numbers generated by the database on the organization's home page. I used the World Bank home page for 85% of the statistics cited. However, when the databank did not have the year requested, I was forced to use Compareallcountries.com. This site also claimed to use World Bank data in its database, but for some reason it had more years represented with slightly differing numbers.

Despite the negatives of the variables, this research references a fact-based and broad sample set and is the necessary first step in developing The Government Dependence Theory. The use of data removes the researcher's bias for or against the provision of social services by the state. Because no one assembled this information in this way before, there is only raw data to represent the connection between GDP expenditure on services and the amount of protests in a country. Despite a few anomalous countries that experienced civil wars, corruption, or other overlapping crises, The Government Dependency Theory makes a well-rounded argument that increased spending on government services makes a dependent population that protests at the threat of removing those services.

VII. ANALYSIS


The Government Dependency Theory cites corroborative evidence on each of the five levels considered in this study. The *Theoretical, Global, State, Community, and Individual Level* research all coincide with the theory and its various elements. For this theory to work, I required a sound doctrine, global statistical trends, and social contracts between the government and its people to correlate with my narrative. I confirmed these aspects along with many others, proving that the Government Dependency Theory justifies further research.

The *Theoretical Level* of this thesis is logical and coincides with published works. The Government Dependency Theory uses Ukraine as an example of domestic protests that elevated to regional unrest. I acknowledge the validity of other theories on the issue of protests. However, I argue that other theories merely explain the side effects and do not address the initial cause of protests. Experts that claim Ukraine's civil war began due to ethnic cleavages ignore the years of peace and the months of united protests before the coup. It is more likely that Putin instigated ethnic cleavages for political and economic benefit. Socioeconomic theories citing voter participation show a slight correlation with protests. However, voter participation is merely a side effect of the massive amounts of GDP spent on services for voter acquisition.

Balancing theories argue that riots broke out because of emerging conflicts between world powers. This too is a side effect. Ukraine only considered strengthening relations with the EU, NATO, and Russia because of the financial debts that amounted mainly due to overspending on inefficient goods and services. Balancing does not explain the individuals drive to protest. Over one million people met and stayed in the plazas because they were personally affected by the removal of services. The individual is not likely to protest because of the international

relations of his country. He likely protests because this winter he will not be able to heat his home, educate his kids, or go to the doctor.

The *Global Level* of the Government Dependency Theory is strengthened by statistical trends on an international scale. I hypothesize that as state spending on services increases, the likelihood of protests during economic crisis also increases. This means that lower spending on social services would not incite riots and allow protests occurrences to stay at the state's average non-crisis year. The correlation between protests and high GDP expenditure countries is very strong. While constructing my database, a surprising pattern appeared. Not only did low expenditure countries experience an average number of protests during economic crisis, their protest numbers decreased compared to non-crisis years. Over 91% of the 147 cases of banking crisis confirm this tendency. This *Global Level* trend is the most persuasive portion of my research. This trend is present in banking crises in every culture and on every continent.



As GDP expenditure increases, the data shows a somewhat gradual inclination for protests. If a country spends less than 20% of GDP on services, it roughly has a 90% chance of decreasing protests during a banking crisis. As expenditures increase to the range of 21%-35% of GDP, the country has a 50% chance of increasing its protest numbers. If the country spends more than 36% of GDP on services, it has a 100% chance of increasing its protests. There are few conflicting cases on the *Global Level* of study. Romania, Kazakhstan, and Bulgaria are three out of 13 cases that contradict my GDP expenditure trends. These cases need to be researched further to determine if intrastate policies like a repressive government, corruption scandal, or ongoing civil war could have had an overpowering effect on protest numbers.

The *State Level* of research encompasses case studies on countries experiencing banking crises. This in-depth study of the internal state workings confirmed that small governments with privatized services experience fewer protests. During my case studies of Ukraine, Estonia, Hungary, and Peru, societal tendencies towards a market economy or a society dependent on government services quickly became evident. Estonia is the poster child for a government that privatizes government services, trusts its market economy, and reforms programs to stay small and efficient. They have one of the lowest expenditures in the EU and experienced a decrease in

protests during their 1992 and 2009 economic crises. The Cases of Hungary and Peru argue that the same cultures can change to become more or less dependent on government services. Their consecutive banking crises had differing levels of GDP expenditure with correlating numbers of protests. When governments pandered to voters by increasing services and control of the economy, the people protested when banking crisis threatened those goods and services. Further *State Level* research is needed to look into the remaining 115 countries that experienced banking crises to determine if these four case studies apply to the rest of the world.

Research at the *Community* and *Individual Levels* corroborated all of the required elements of my theory. My theory argues that because everyone is similarly affected by bankruptcy in a sprawling state, that the crowds will be very diverse. Table 1 Shows the diversity in the crowds during the Ukrainian coup. One message or leader did not unite this level of diversity. They were united by the common grievance against the central government.

Table 1.
Ukrainian Protester diversity

92%	Do not identify with a political party
55%	Speak Ukrainian
16%	Speak Russian
24%	Spoke mixture of Russian and Ukrainian
83%	Arrived on their own without any NGO, Organization, or group
56%	Men
47%	Women
	12% Kiev, 55% Western, 24% Central, 21% East + South
	12% higher educated, 9% students, 9% entrepreneurs, 9% pensioners, 8% managers, 7% workers, 40% specialists, 17.5% unemployed/part time workers

In-person interviews and polls attested to the social contract between the people and the government. This social contract is an agreement between the state and its people requiring the government to provide its citizens with a safety net that guarantees their daily needs of health, housing, employment, food, education, and welfare among other things. Because I created this theory, interviewees were hesitant to confirm all of my conclusions. Their ideals did not mesh

with the message of the Government Dependency Theory. I argue that the state should outsource its social services while my expert interviewees believed as Europeans do - The social contract should guarantee a safety net of goods for its people. This is an idealistic opinion and not one based on my data. I think there should be provisions for the poor and needy. However, as I argue in the Policy Implications section, these services could be more efficient and better targeted if they were provided by corporations. As my data shows, diversifying this responsibility reduces the amounts of protests during banking crises.

The Government Dependency Theory is confirmed by global trends, intrastate workings, community polls, and personal interviews. Conflicting evidence is scarce and needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Case studies of Romania, Kazakhstan, and Bulgaria in addition to the ten other conflicting events would determine why these states did the opposite of what I predicted. Further research of countries that do abide by my theory could disprove alternate hypotheses like cultural conflicts and socioeconomic status.

VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Government Dependency Theory requires a country to enact complex and politically unpopular reforms to reduce its susceptibility for mass protests. Social policy reversal is a long and arduous process requiring attention the five levels of study covered in this thesis. Reforms should involve advisory International institutions, restructuring public services, and changing the community's social contract with the government. These reforms have political and social hurdles to overcome in order to be successful. Protests and unrest are preventable events during economic crisis. With the help of further research, international guidance, and political courage, administrations can put their budgets back on track and stop the unrest that can accompany mass protests (Vis and Kersbergen 2007).

At the *Global Level*, international assistance could guide socialist states through reforms, eventually delivering targeted and quality services to its population with minimum expenditure. The World Bank and IMF are the two most qualified organizations to restructure debt, privatize services, and reduce GDP expenditures. International institutions should identify countries spending more than 25% of GDP on social services and use proactive reforms to address overspending before a crisis occurs. Austerity gained a bad reputation since the economic crisis in 2009. Austerity reforms in Italy, England, and Germany increased national debt and shrunk their economies by 2013. The IMF forecasted this would happen; claiming budget cuts would damage a European economy that was already experiencing economic crisis (Blyth 2013). Reforming social spending, increasing savings, and honing targeted government goods need to happen in preparation for an unforeseen economic crisis and not in reaction to one. Currently, states undergo reforms when there is no other option. This drains funding from public goods

when the state's social safety net is needed most. Like in Estonia, austerity should be applied during boom years in preparation for economic crisis. Reforms would first find a socially acceptable way to target services and limit the recipients to only those who truly need help. This would reduce the number of dependent citizens and limit expenditures while helping the needy climb out of poverty (Vis and Kersbergen 2007). International institutions can start this reform by promoting economies like Estonia instead of Denmark.

Nordic states supposedly exemplify the “modern” social service system. Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland often rate at the top of the charts for economic competitiveness, social health, and even happiness. They even claim to have a privatized healthcare system that allows companies to run hospitals. However, not all Nordics are created equal. Finland and Norway spent roughly 23% of GDP on services and experienced double digit reductions in protests while Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland all spend over 36% of GDP on services and experienced over 400% increase in protests. They employ 30% of their workforce in the public sector compared to a European average of 15%. Taxation encourages entrepreneurs to move abroad, while too many people live off benefits (The Next Supermodel 2013). Nordic states also have an undocumented environment of corruption. Procedural fairness is low while the public's distrust of public officials is widespread. This suggests that Nordic states are not more honest or efficiently serving their communities, but that their corruption is more difficult to track (Erlingsson 2014). This shows that no matter the level of efficiency or privatization the government service industry claims to have, ownership is displayed through expenditure. This clear measure of government spending proves its worth in Nordic states. GDP expenditure is the difference between these similar cultures and systems and is the reason why they experience vastly different levels of protests during crisis.

International institutions should encourage countries with high GDP expenditure to employ Estonia's 4Cs program to their public services. Each country should: 1) Challenge the need for the service 2) Compare performance with private providers 3) Consult with the taxpayer, and 4) Compete in the market to stay profitable. These four steps allow some government control over services, but only in industries where its characteristics are well suited for profitability. These four challenges need honest answers and therefore, a society free of corruption.

Limiting government powers and overreach are necessary to accomplish the reforms that the Government Dependency Theory requires of protest-free nations. Countries should follow Estonia's example of saving money during boom years to cover a limited number of services during the inevitable economic crisis. Politicians often use new revenue to bolster voter support. I suggest annually decreasing expenditures on goods until it is operable while using 25% of GDP. After this budget is accomplished, the country should limit expenditures to only a fraction of the country's economic growth. If legislation impeded politicians from increasing goods in exchange for votes then citizens would vote for the best steward of that limited money. Responsible leadership can pay dividends. As previously stated Estonia cut its services in 2009, experienced no protests, and re-elected the party that responsibly navigated the economic crisis (Raudla 2013).

Many *State Level* reforms for public services claim to provide the best service at the highest efficiency. Although there are many promising policies, there is limited space in this section and I cannot cover them all. I do however want to lay out a framework for the kinds of services the Government Dependency Theory supports. Goods and services need to be: 1) Supplied by diverse sources 2) Highly targeted to those in need 3) Designed to lift the needy out

of poverty and not simply sustain life 4) Necessary and cost effective, and 5) Without political influence.

Studies show that the United States' unemployed were three times as likely to get a job in the last week of their unemployment benefit payments. Other statistical examples similarly show a systemic abuse of benefits that unnecessarily burdens state budgets. The state of Oregon enacted a policy in 1998 called JOBS, which required the unemployed to report to a government-funded job within private industry. In exchange for the labor, the employee receives monies otherwise received through unemployment benefits. With the help of assisted job searching, this "workfare" policy helped JOBS employees to find employment¹, shortened the amount of time on government benefits, and saved state money when compared to traditional welfare. JOBS cut recipients by 85%, limited time before finding another job by 85%, and reduced layoffs by 5%²(Cornerly 1998).

This policy meets all five points of my required framework. The program achieved diversity by using multiple private organizations to supply positions for unemployed workers. It was highly targeted because applicants were truly in need³. It lifted those in need out of poverty by providing a much-needed safety net while incentivizing workers to find new employment. This service was also a political win by putting people back to work and not by spending money on poorly performing services. Oregon's JOBS program reduced mistreatment of benefits and the number of those dependent on government services. In order to shrink government and

¹ Participants also found work that they wanted vs a job that they were assigned to by the government program.

² Employers had a higher risk of not getting skilled labor back when the JOBS program made it more likely to find different full-time employment.

³ Company executives with severance packages and those choosing to retire or taking a break after a layoff would all not likely apply to benefits requiring temporary job placement.

reduce protests, I would encourage at-risk European countries to apply this style of services to many other public goods besides unemployment (Cornerly 1998).

The International Community should monitor two *State Level* cases in the coming years to gauge the continuation of government dependency themes past the 2009 crisis. The United States and Brazil are countries at different points of evolution towards government sprawl. The United States has a comfortable expenditure at 23% of GDP on social services. However, The Republican win at the 2014 mid-term election will put Democrats in a corner. Revenue from the recovering economy will tempt the president to fund executive decisions that extend services and bolster voter support (as seen in Hungary). The new Affordable Care Act (ACA) demonstrates the expanding tendency of the government. The United States is evolving into a larger player in its civilians' life by being the sole organizer of healthcare benefits. The rollout of the ACA website showed how a simple website glitch affected millions of people and tarnished a program's otherwise promising reputation. The US has the opportunity to adjust the ACA to abide by my five-point public service structure. This is simply one form of government spending that can be better targeted and reduced. The government could privatize hundreds of programs and channel GDP into savings in preparation for the next economic crisis. The US needs to emulate Estonia's protest free country instead of EU whose foundation is rocked by protests during economic crisis (Gilbert 2009; The Obamacare Escalator 2014; Tobing and Jeng 2012).

Brazil represents a country whose government is too big to survive the next economic crisis without increased protests. Brazil's general government total expenditure stands at 39% of GDP. The re-election of Dilma Rousseff as the president of Brazil shows the public's favor toward promised benefits during recent runoffs. Ms. Rousseff was able to pull all of the tricks of a socialist candidate. She flip flopped on public service promises, was a poor steward of the

economy, and meddled in private industry. Her account deficits, falling currencies, high inflation, and slow growth places this high GDP spending country at risk of increased protests during the next economic crisis (The Dodgiest Duo in the Suspect Six 2014; Why Brazil Needs Change 2014).

Brazil does not have enough time for significant reductions in expenditures and should ready itself for protests in the near-term. To reduce the likelihood of mass protests at the first signs of banking crisis, Brazil's police force should be prepared and its population should have segregated interests. Police in major cities should be equipped with riot gear and trained in its utilization. Experts argue that Tiananmen Square protests were deadly because the Chinese army was ill prepared for crowd control, instead using military tactics. Proper training can reduce the likelihood of violent backlash leading to civil war. The country should also segregate employment and limit the powers of unions. This would ensure that no single grievance with the government attracts mass support. Policymakers also need to preemptively address hate speech designed to cause ethnic cleavages for political, social, or economic gain. If these policies do not prevent Brazil's protests, the government needs to negotiate with protesters and make them establish a message. Creating a narrowly defined message for the movement will limit the numbers of protesters because it will only apply to a portion of the population.

Changing the culture of dependency at the *Community Level* is the hardest aspect of reform. The social contract between state services and its people is a long-standing relationship. The government should tie expenditure to a portion of state revenue. This will limit the politicians' power to act on political incentives to extend services and expand the government. In addition, states should have role models spread new ideals. A local soccer player should announce that Brazilians need to be a more independent and self-reliant citizens. This statement

would affect the youth's perception of the government's role in their lives. They can also point to the harsh realities in neighboring countries that are highly dependent on their governments. This comparison would show how difficult survival would be with too many civilians relying on the same safety net with limited resources during banking crises. Lastly, the re-elected president should encourage policymakers to reimagine service provisions and reward them for privatization and money savings. This will remove political influences and change the system from the top down.

The Government Dependency Theory is not an economic model. However, I lay out an economically feasible model that will better target beneficiaries while reducing GDP expenditure on social goods. With this effort, countries can reduce the amount of those dependent on government services and experience less protests during economic crises. These ideas and many others are needed to change the gradual expansion of government and reduce the likelihood of protests.

IX. CONCLUSION

I designed the Government Dependency Theory to show how a population's dependency on government services increases the likelihood of protests during economic crisis. I reviewed five levels of study ranging from global databases to expert interviews. The correlation of government dependence and protests was evident at every level of study. Countries threatened by bankruptcy endure daily protests because the government's expansive social contract affected millions of people when it went unfulfilled. Some experience unrest while certain countries have repeatedly reduced protests during economic crisis. This paper shows that the number of protests during economic crisis positively correlate to the percentage of GDP the government spends on services, creating a society dependent on government benefits.

The 2009 crisis shows us that economic recovery is a long and arduous process. During this recovery, the state will experience either increased or decreased protests depending on the level of government dependency. Belgium's crisis started in 2008, it spends 42% of GDP on services, and is reportedly still enduring a 336% increase in the number of protests. On November 6th, "Belgian riot police have fired tear gas and water cannon during clashes with demonstrators while an estimated 100,000 people marched through Brussels in the first mass protests against the new government's austerity measures" (Belgium protesters clash with police 2014). The Government Dependency Theory does not forecast single protests. Instead, it predicts mass protests that endure for the entirety of the nation's recovery. If protests are allowed to increase for the duration of the economic crisis, it will cost millions in damages, weaken FDI, and possibly cause the deaths of civilians.

The *Theoretical Level* of my theory is strengthened by existing research on state governance and social interaction. The Government Dependency Theory is falsifiable, collectively exhaustive, and mutually exclusive. Ethnic, socioeconomic, and realist theories do not act as instigators of unrest when applied to mass protests. Other theories explain the side effects of protests like ethnic cleavages, political participation, and international balancing of influences. However, they do not address the cause of mass protests. My theory identifies the true cause of protests. The data accumulated in this text refutes other theories and only bolsters my prediction that societies dependent on government spending will protest when those assets are threatened by economic crisis.

The *Global Level* displays an impressive correlation between GDP expenditure and increasing protests during economic crisis. Only .09% of the 147 cases of economic crisis contradicts my theory. Increased protests in Romania and decreased protests in Mauritania are two examples of countries whose data does not correlate with my theory. These cases need to be studied further to determine domestic influences that could have overpowered the effects of my theory. Possible reasons could be repressive governments or populations hindered by geographical or logistical challenges to protest. Countries, governments, and populations are all fluid entities and cannot be predicted or theorized with 100% accuracy. Despite these fringe cases, the Government Dependency Theory shows promise for further research.

The *State* and *Community Levels* have evidence from case studies and protest polls. These two methods provide an in-depth view of state workings not seen at the *Global* or *Theoretical Levels*. The internal influences of party politics, voter pandering, and the state's social contract with its people were irreplaceable pieces of evidence that only support my theory. Polls show that communities high in protests are also highly dependent on the government. The

variety of civilian grievances only had the government to blame. This rallies a diverse mass of citizens in anti-government protests. The amount of privatization during reform is difficult to measure. When digging into the *State Level*, experts claim that a state's reform was not genuine or complete. While other socialist states supposedly are socialist by name only with internal workings of free markets. This complicates my research, which strives to paint a black and white picture of the situation. Despite this affect, my theory is bolstered by in-depth study of the internal workings of the state and the mindset of its people.

I confirm most of the societal affects needed in my theory with personal interviews on the *Individual Level*. Among other things, interviews confirmed ethnic ideologies, protest mobilization methods, and civilian perspectives of the government and its services. My theory is new and contradicts many people's idea of the government's social provisions. For this reason, my expert interviewees were somewhat hesitant to back my conclusions. However, they were supportive of all the characteristics I deemed necessary for my theory to work. As discussed in the Policy Implications section, the social mentality will be the hardest aspect to change. My suggested policies are not normative statements. You will never hear my policy suggestions spoken on a campaign trail. They are simply policies that would mitigate protests during economic crisis. Since this theory has not been previously published, expert interviews were a necessary aspect of my study designed to gauge the response from critical thinkers in the field. Interviewees confirmed necessary aspects of my argument and therefore strengthened my theory.

Further research is needed to confirm my hypotheses and establish useful policies for reducing protests in the future. Further case study research of the 147 instances of economic crisis would help policymakers understand the internal workings of the state. Polling participants in mass protests would support the theory that individuals value government services, have

grievances against the government, and are ethnically and politically diverse. Polls would also need to show a certain level of injustice felt by the individual to cause them to protest. A standardized definition of anti-government protests, mass protests, and dependence should be established and measured. This theory could also be tested during other established cases of economic crisis that do not involve banking crisis. Further study could establish the proper scale and pace of austerity reforms in order to reduce GDP expenditure on services without causing protests.

The Government Dependency Theory is a promising format that requires further research. Currently, it demonstrates a strong correlation between percentage of GDP expenditure on services and the amount of protests experienced during economic crisis. The future of this theory will depend on the future occurrence of protests in countries like Brazil and the United States. What paths are taken and the outcome of protests will either strengthen or convolute my *Global Level* statistics. Countries aware of the connection between services and protests could prepare police forces, revamp public services, save during boom years, safely segregate community interests, and slowly reduce GDP expenditure and the size of the government. This politically risky and counterintuitive idea of less services will reduce protests is what makes states continue down the path of sprawling government provisions. Estonia discovered a protest-free method to privatize services, reduce government dependency, and shrink the size of government during economic crisis; and therefore, exemplifies an economically feasible path for the future state and its social contract with its people.

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Country	Start	End	Output Loss	Fiscal Cost\$2	Peak Liquidity Y	Liquidity Y	Peak Support	NPLs4	Increase in Debt	Public Expansions	Monetary Protesting	Average Protesting	Protest t Non-Crisis years	Protest Strength besides crisis years	% Increase / Decrease in Crisis Years	Strength of Protests	Non-Crisis Years	Random Years Used	Random Years Used	Crisis Year2000	% Increase / Decrease in Crisis Years2	Total Expenditure of GDP	Year GDP Data was Recorded
Albania	1994	1994	—	—	7.6	—	26.8	—	62	62	93	0.031365	-33.3%	39.1%	71.25	0.036333	1985	1989	1977	2000	-33.3%	20.70%	1992
Algeria	1990	19949	41.4	—	37.6	29.9	30	19.1	-4.7	31.7	57.9	0.016813	-45.3%	63.3%	126.25	0.011435	2007	1998	2011	2013	-45.3%	6.20%	1991
Argentina	1980	19928	58.2	55.1	64.6	62.2	9	33.1	10.6	26.6	87.9	0.012916	-69.7%	86.9%	25	0.044508	1978	1987	1985	1999	-69.7%	18%	1980
Argentina	1989	1991	12.6	6	151.6	135.7	27	-21.3	10	83	87.9	0.012916	-5.6%	79.9%	25	0.044508	1978	1987	1985	1999	-5.6%	10.57%	1990
Argentina	1995	1995	0	2	71.4	63	17	8.7	-0.8	37	87.9	0.012916	-57.9%	64.1%	25	0.044508	1978	1987	1985	1999	-57.9%	13.35	1995
Argentina	2001	2003	70.9	9.6	22.9	22.6	20.1	81.9	8.2	132	87.9	0.012916	50.2%	47.8%	25	0.044508	1978	1987	1985	1999	50.2%	22.5% -	2000-
Armenia4	1994	19948	—	—	41.4	23	—	—	—	16	71	0.017943	-77.3%	54.7%	82.5	0.019868	2010	1978	1990	2008	-77.3%	11.27%	1994
Austria	2008	—	13.8	4.9	11.7	7.7	2.8	14.8	8.3	124.14	33	0.036232	276.2%	-84.5%	29.5	0.040622	2004	2001	1993	1983	276.2%	39%	-2007
Azerbaijan	1995	19958	—	—	127.6	84.5	—	0.9	—	16.3	96.7	0.017372	-83.1%	49.8%	115	0.025176	1989	2013	2001	1997	-83.1%	19.8	1995
Bangladesh	1987	1987	0	—	26	2.8	20	3.5	1.4	79.3	122.5	0.021597	-35.3%	71.1%	141.75	0.029991	2008	1982	1993	2012	-35.3%	4.29%	1987
Belarus	1995	1995	—	—	35.8	—	—	-16.5	—	36	69	0.015293	-47.8%	65.9%	74.75	0.025339	1991	1977	2010	2006	-47.8%	21%	1995
Belgium	2008	—	19.1	6	19.7	14.1	3.1	18.7	8.3	183.42	42	0.029482	336.7%	-44.6%	45.25	0.038734	1992	1998	2000	1986	336.7%	42%	2008
Benin	1988	19929	14.9	17	99.6	48.6	80	5.7	13	5.14	13	0.006128	-60.3%	89.5%	13.5	0.015025	1999	2009	1985	2000	-60.3%	13.19%	1988
Bolivia	1986	1986	49.2	—	57.5	25.9	30	-107.3	1.7	11.3	38.3	0.019388	-70.5%	62.6%	39	0.041263	2008	1982	1999	2005	-70.5%	9.45%	1986
Bolivia	1994	1994	0	6	31.9	12.9	6.2	-19.2	1.6	5.6	38.3	0.019388	-85.4%	37.4%	39	0.041263	2008	1982	1999	2005	-85.4%	13.57%	1994
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	19969	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	106	36	0.011996	194.4%	72.4%	9.5	0.019006	2008	1982	1999	2005	194.4%	—	—
Brazil	1990	19949	62.3	0	11.3	10.7	—	-22.6	7.7	33.5	79.6	0.013958	-57.9%	50.3%	35.75	0.043773	2001	2002	1983	1987	-57.9%	23%	1991
Brazil	1994	1998	0	13.2	20.1	17.6	16	-33.8	-4.3	33.5	79.6	0.013958	-57.9%	50.3%	35.75	0.043773	2001	2002	1983	1987	-57.9%	33%	1994
Bulgaria	1996	1997	63.1	14	17.3	9.9	75	-30.1	-2.2	67	68.3	0.018917	-1.9%	27.6%	110	0.049178	1993	1986	1983	2005	-1.9%	39%	1996
Burkina Faso	1990	1994	—	—	9.4	4.5	16	8.9	2.8	3	15.2	0.011355	-80.3%	68.4%	10.25	0.022581	2001	1996	2000	1988	-80.3%	21.06%	1990
Burundi	1994	19989	121.2	—	23.4	18.3	25	10.9	2.6	23	18	0.01254	27.8%	57.3%	5.25	0.026746	2005	1978	1982	1991	27.8%	18%	1993
Cameroon	1987	19919	105.5	—	59.1	40.9	65	18	1	5.8	18.7	0.00865	-69.0%	83.4%	24.5	0.017374	1993	2010	2005	2007	-69.0%	24%	1990
Cameroon	1995	1997	8.1	—	12.3	6.2	30	-1.1	0.4	10.2	18.7	0.00865	-45.3%	63.3%	24.5	0.017374	1993	2010	2005	2007	-45.3%	12%	1994
Cape Verde	1993	1993	0	—	4	—	30	18.2	-40.6	0.33	1	0.011702	-67.0%	73.6%	0.5	0.001693	1999	1999	2004	2003	-67.0%	13.05%	1993
Central African Rep	1976	1976	0	—	90.8	10.5	—	-4.8	2.5	no data	19.2	0.012479	—	—	8	0.019033	2002	1992	1988	1989	—	13.54	1976
Central African Rep	1995	1996	1.6	—	24.8	20.9	40	-16.3	0.7	11.25	19.2	0.012479	-41.4%	57.9%	8	0.019033	2002	1992	1988	1989	-41.4%	14.91%	1995
Chad	1983	1983	0	—	199.3	41.3	—	-7.2	-0.3	3	21	0.010857	-85.7%	81.1%	5.25	0.029505	1989	2008	1981	2000	-85.7%	6.05%	1983
Chad	1992	19969	0	—	120.9	41.4	35	27.1	-0.8	12	21	0.010857	-42.9%	72.8%	5.25	0.029505	1989	2008	1981	2000	-42.9%	9.20%	1992
Chile	1976	1976	19.9	—	32.2	23.6	—	-69.5	1.6	no data	63.9	0.01555	—	—	26	0.035707	2004	1992	1995	1996	—	13.98%	1976
Chile	1981	19859	8.6	42.9	61.2	52.7	35.6	87.9	0.5	53.28	63.9	0.01555	-16.6%	85.5%	26	0.035707	2004	1992	1995	1996	-16.6%	13.15	1981
China, Mainland	1998	1998	19.5	18	62	7.2	20	11.2	0	316	215.9	0.059764	46.4%	-14.3%	122	0.082917	1981	1995	1994	1982	46.4%	14.64%	1998
Colombia	1982	1982	47	5	21.1	7.7	4.1	16.6	-0.8	9.3	54.3	0.018435	-82.9%	77.6%	18.75	0.056968	1986	1985	1992	1994	-82.9%	10.93%	1982
Colombia	1998	2000	43.9	6.3	5.1	4.3	14	15.4	0.5	72.8	54.3	0.018435	34.1%	-7.6%	18.75	0.056968	1986	1985	1992	1994	34.1%	23%	1999
Congo, Dem Rep	1983	1983	1.4	—	20	18.9	—	39.5	—	0	37.5	0.011754	-100.0%	#DIV/0!	40.75	0.012577	2003	2009	1998	1985	-100.0%	7.53%	1983
Congo, Dem Rep	1991	19949	129.5	—	44.7	30.2	—	42.2	—	17.3	37.5	0.011754	-53.9%	75.7%	40.75	0.012577	2003	2009	1998	1985	-53.9%	13.31%	1991
Congo, Dem Rep	1994	19989	79	—	77.3	77.1	75	39.3	—	47	37.5	0.011754	25.3%	58.4%	40.75	0.012577	2003	2009	1998	1985	25.3%	22.00%	1992
Congo, Rep	1992	1994	47.4	—	30.7	16.6	—	103.5	1.4	7.8	16.3	0.008006	-52.1%	79.1%	2.25	0.017037	1980	2003	1978	1986	-52.1%	26.90%	1992
Costa Rica	1987	1991	0	—	20.2	6.1	—	-27.5	2.9	8	18	0.015435	-55.6%	61.7%	17.75	0.01888	2001	1985	2013	2007	-55.6%	12.18%	1987
Costa Rica	1994	1995	0	—	15.2	6.3	32	4.8	1.1	2.75	18	0.015435	-84.7%	47.1%	17.75	0.01888	2001	1985	2013	2007	-84.7%	13.80%	1994
Cote d'Ivoire	1988	19929	44.8	25	76.9	22.5	50	13.6	-3.3	10.71	44	0.01637	-75.7%	-167.8%	35	0.02353	2008	2005	1999	1983	-75.7%	17%	1988
Croatia	1996	1999	—	6.9	3.2	3.1	10.5	14.1	5.2	141	58.9	0.026317	139.4%	-26.6%	46.5	0.055246	1990	1981	1997	1988	139.4%	37.10%	1998
Czech Republic	1996	2009	—	6.8	12.7	4.2	18	1.8	-1.3	97.7	71.3	0.023562	37.0%	7.2%	107	0.028061	1995	1983	2009	1987	37.0%	30%	-1996
Denmark	2008	—	36.3	3.1	20.1	11.4	4.5	24.9	1.2	131.28	21.5	0.044687	510.6%	-518.3%	11.25	0.068937	1981	1988	1992	1999	510.6%	36%	2009

Djibouti	1991	19959	0	—	5.2	3.2	—	—	—	—	4.5	12.8	0.008162	-64.8%	84.6%	17.75	0.024645	1984, 1997, 2004, 2013	-64.8%	31.50%	1991
Dominican Rep	2003	2004	—	22	43.4	38.1	9	16.5	6.7	12	13.5	0.014858	-11.1%	-22.2%	8.75	0.045268	1997, 2006, 2001, 1991	-11.1%	13.70%	2004	
Ecuador	1982	19869	98.2	—	146.7	100	—	24.4	-1.7	6	25	0.011822	-76.0%	86.5%	13.5	0.021013	2008, 1978, 1979, 2008	-76.0%	17%	1982	
Ecuador	1998	2002	23.3	21.7	26	22.5	40	9.1	-0.5	35.8	25	0.011822	43.2%	85.7%	13.5	0.021013	2008, 1978, 1979, 2008	43.2%	12%	1998	
Egypt	1980	1980	0.9	—	66.7	22.7	—	-4.2	-2.3	36.6	127.8	0.039488	-71.4%	69.8%	151	0.046243	1994, 2012, 2003, 1984	-71.4%	15.64%	1980	
El Salvador	1989	1990	0	—	51.6	11.5	37	-29.6	—	28.75	21.3	0.048827	35.0%	2.1%	27.5	0.037906	1996, 1984, 1994, 1997	35.0%	12.19	1989	
Equatorial Guinea	1983	19838	0	—	75.8	—	—	—	—	—	1	26	0.010289	-96.2%	80.2%	41.5	0.01565	2010, 1996, 2011, 1999	-96.2%	30.12%	1983
Eritrea	1993	19938	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.6	16	0.011516	-90.0%	77.2%	4.5	0.012688	1984, 1981, 2005, 1988	-90.0%	31%	1993
Estonia	1992	1994	—	1.9	30.9	—	7	—	—	15	17.2	0.019133	-12.8%	58.4%	11.25	0.043916	2008, 1983, 1984, 1996	-12.8%	16%	1992	
Finland	1991	1995	67.3	12.8	12	5.5	13	43.6	—	8.5	28.5	0.008924	-70.2%	76.8%	27.75	0.05525	2003, 1979, 2009, 1989	-70.2%	24%	1990	
France	2008	—	23.6	1	8.9	7.4	4	17.3	8.3	297	178	0.053741	66.9%	-200.2%	181	0.051288	1985, 2002, 1993, 2004	66.9%	48%	2009	
Georgia	1991	19959	—	—	—	—	33	—	—	28.4	70.2	0.011767	-59.5%	73.3%	43.75	0.023299	2012, 1983, 1984, 1980	-59.5%	9.50%	1991	
Germany	2008	—	12.1	1.8	11.5	3.6	3.7	17.8	8.3	280	153	0.059779	83.0%	-397.0%	108	0.094864	1980, 1985, 1991, 1990	83.0%	30%	2008	
Ghana	1982	1983	14.1	6	0.2	0.1	35	15.5	-0.5	5.75	70	0.008531	-91.8%	87.4%	46.75	0.009528	1999, 2004, 2000, 2012	-91.8%	6.48%	1982	
Greece	2008	—	43.1	27.3	44.3	42.3	14.7	44.5	8.3	227	63	0.035461	260.3%	-174.7%	45.5	0.030266	1996, 2005, 1984, 1977	260.3%	52%	2009	
Guinea	1985	19858	0	3	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	—	#DIV/0!	100.0%	8.75	0.042618	2003, 1988, 1981, 1979	—	11.44%	1986	
Guinea	1993	1993	0	—	14.6	3.9	45	6.7	—	1	—	—	#DIV/0!	100.0%	8.75	0.042618	2003, 1988, 1981, 1979	—	8.34%	1993	
Guinea-Bissau	1995	1998	15.7	—	137.3	39.2	45	108.1	11.4	3.1	6.3	0.011125	-50.8%	38.7%	6.75	0.003902	1987, 2008, 2012, 1981	-50.8%	6.41%	1995	
Guyana	1993	1993	0	—	1.8	1.7	—	-241.0	-10.5	0.6	10.8	0.009599	-94.4%	78.1%	1.5	0.010921	1986, 1989, 2006, 1982	-94.4%	15.60%	1993	
Haiti	1994	1998	37.5	—	4.8	—	—	-119.4	-5.8	47.7	66.3	0.028562	-28.1%	19.8%	39.75	0.037768	2000, 1978, 1989, 1991	-28.1%	10.70%	1994	
Hungary	1991	19959	—	10	47	4.6	23	19.6	4.5	19.8	59	0.029193	-66.4%	37.9%	61.5	0.057174	2005, 2002, 1980, 1997	-66.4%	10.60%	1990	
Hungary	2008	—	39.9	2.7	1.4	1.3	13.3	-0.3	-0.8	118	59	0.029193	100.0%	-485.5%	61.5	0.057174	2005, 2002, 1980, 1997	100.0%	45%	2008	
Iceland	2008	—	41.9	44.2	21.2	16.8	61.2	72.2	-2.3	40.2	1.8	0.03542	2133.3%	-860.2%	1	0.021559	1983, 1978, 1979, 2003	2133.3%	44%	2008	
India	1993	1993	0	—	4.3	3.6	20	-7.7	1.3	117	201	0.051926	-41.8%	20.3%	136.5	0.054606	1991, 1996, 1981, 2003	-41.8%	15%	1993	
Indonesia	1997	20019	69	56.8	23.1	17.2	32.5	67.6	4.5	201	122	0.020899	64.8%	53.6%	166	0.012663	2008, 1978, 2009, 2004	64.8%	12.50%	1997	
Ireland	2008	—	105.3	40.7	20	16.3	12.9	72.8	8.3	227	48.9	0.065092	364.2%	-780.8%	36.5	0.062019	1997, 1980, 1978, 1986	364.2%	45%	2009	
Israel	1977	1977	76	30	43.2	16.5	—	—	28.4	no data	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Italy	2008	—	33.2	0.3	7.7	5.7	11	8.6	8.3	250	97	0.041614	157.7%	-341.8%	47	0.087128	1988, 1992, 1982, 1979	157.7%	44%	2009	
Jamaica	1996	1998	32.2	43.9	0.4	0.3	28.9	2.9	7.6	7.6	35	0.00682	-78.3%	55.4%	8	0.050807	2.005, 198, 519, 801, 970	-78.3%	13%	1996	
Japan	1997	20019	45	14	2.4	1.6	35	41.7	7.2	174.8	150	0.032872	16.5%	-10.4%	168	0.027363	1980, 1981, 1988, 2004	16.5%	14%	1995	
Jordan	1989	1991	106.4	10	20.7	16.1	—	-61.0	15.5	27	67.2	0.016894	-59.8%	77.1%	45.25	0.074578	2000, 2004, 1983, 1981	-59.8%	26%	1989	
Kazakhstan	2008	—	0	3.7	5.5	5	31.9	9.1	3.3	74.6	14.5	0.023221	414.5%	-483.9%	8	0.026609	1981, 1985, 1994, 2000	414.5%	10.19%	2008	
Kenya	1985	1985	23.7	—	2	1.9	—	11	0.5	10	112.7	0.018964	-91.1%	71.6%	107	0.054039	2008, 1987, 1990, 2000	-91.1%	17.46%	1985	
Kenya	1992	1994	50.3	—	25.2	24.3	—	12.1	7.4	38.2	112.7	0.018964	-66.1%	63.1%	107	0.054039	2008, 1987, 1990, 2000	-66.1%	16%	1992	
Korea	1997	1998	56.1	31.2	27.4	11.9	35	9.9	-0.4	166.75	126	0.040335	32.3%	-33.2%	89.25	0.083861	1985, 1993, 1980, 2004	32.3%	13.00%	1997	
Kuwait	1982	1985	143.4	—	9.6	2.9	40	16.2	2.5	3.5	43.7	0.01736	-92.0%	75.4%	37.5	0.041095	1990, 1992, 1998, 2003	-92.0%	19.27%	1982	
Kyrgyz Rep	1995	19999	—	—	286.1	51.8	85	42.9	—	9.4	49	0.013037	-80.8%	7.6%	40.7	0.009338	2002, 1980, 2003, 1983	-80.8%	19.50%	1995	
Latvia	1995	1996	—	3	9.2	5.5	20	0.4	—	10.5	15	0.027746	-30.0%	2.3%	21.75	0.038094	1986, 1991, 2004, 1984	-30.0%	20.10%	1995	
Latvia	2008	—	106.2	5.6	3.6	3.4	15.9	28.1	-2.7	45	15	0.027746	200.0%	-662.5%	21.75	0.038094	1986, 1991, 2004, 1984	200.0%	30%	2008	
Lebanon	1990	1993	102.2	—	4.4	2.8	—	—	—	71	111.5	0.029719	-36.3%	57.0%	114.5	0.036269	1981, 1998, 2000, 2010	-36.3%	18%	1989	
Liberia	1991	19959	—	—	85.2	84.2	—	—	—	23.14	50.4	0.012872	-54.1%	69.6%	31.5	0.240092	2001, 1979, 1998, 1997	-54.1%	—	—	
Lithuania	1995	1996	—	3.1	27.5	18.9	32.2	10.8	—	—	22.61	0.023613	-100.0%	#DIV/0!	—	—	—	-100.0%	—	—	
Luxembourg	2008	—	36.4	7.7	14.7	4.1	1.3	14.6	8.3	14.3	6.86	0.013331	108.5%	-250.5%	0.5	0.0063	1970, 1992, 1977, 1991	108.5%	36%	2008	
Macedonia	1993	1995	—	32	22.3	—	70	—	—	2.2	5.5	0.012327	-60.0%	66.7%	8.75	0.024652	2011, 1991, 1986, 1979	-60.0%	22%	1993	
Madagascar	1988	1988	0	—	20.2	19.4	25	-25.8	1	2.3	10.67	0.012449	-78.4%	79.5%	1.5	0.010824	1990, 2001, 1980, 1975	-78.4%	8.14%	1988	
Malaysia	1997	1999	31.4	16.4	9.7	8.8	30	0.2	4	76	67.18	0.013914	13.1%	43.3%	48.5	0.04551	1979, 1985, 2001, 2004	13.1%	17%	1997	
Mali	1987	19919	0	—	50.5	14.8	75	-11.3	1.7	5	14.7	0.010954	-66.0%	80.0%	4	0.004378	2001, 2009, 1975, 1973	-66.0%	14.16%	1987	
Mauritania	1984	1984	7.5	15	48.4	27.7	70	—	1.2	0.33	14.86	0.009856	-97.8%	80.4%	0.7	0.07622	1993, 1975, 1982, 1987	-97.8%	30.74%	1984	
Mexico	1981	19859	26.6	—	5.3	2.6	—	22.6	5	31	75.3	0.022516	-58.8%	73.6%	57	0.060698	1988, 2000, 01, 1979	-58.8%	10.70%	1981	

Mexico	1994	1996	10.2	19.3	16.8	15.8	18.9	16.4	0.4	67.6	75.3	0.022516	-10.2%	44.6%	57	0.060698	1988	2000	01	1979	-10.2%	12.50%	1994	
Mongolia	2008	—	0	4.2	10.5	9.4	—	-5.0	3	20.6	7	0.019317	194.3%	-189.8%	13	0.005954	2013	1985	2001	2007	194.3%	25%	2008	
Morocco	1980	19849	21.9	—	22.1	8.6	—	35.6	-1.0	6.8	39.09	0.013771	-82.6%	86.1%	75	0.017202	1997	1996	2003	2012	-82.6%	18.34%	1980	
Mozambique	1987	19919	0	—	4.2	4.2	—	60.9	-36.6	19.2	19.8	0.019789	-3.0%	61.9%	35.5	0.017202	1997	1996	2003	2012	-3.0%	11.07%	1987	
Nepal	1988	1988	0	—	14.6	3.8	29	11.7	2.1	7	13.5	0.019811	-48.1%	63.1%	73	0.038028	1996	1980	1994	2007	-48.1%	8.90%	1988	
Netherlands	2008	—	23	12.7	5.9	3.7	3.2	26.8	8.3	192	23	0.036133	734.8%	-628.0%	16	0.026454	2003	1974	1988	1975	734.8%	40%	2008	
Nicaragua	1990	1993	11.4	—	195.1	156.5	50	-31.0	—	18.3	25	0.051395	-26.8%	-0.8%	41	0.021528	2010	1976	1985	2013	-26.8%	23%	1991	
Nicaragua	2000	2001	0	13.6	21.8	20.9	12.7	14.9	3.3	10	25	0.051395	-60.0%	-245.9%	41	0.021528	2010	1976	1985	2013	-60.0%	13%	2000	
Niger	1983	1985	97.2	—	45.6	14.1	50	25.9	3.5	0.2	14.9	0.017129	-98.7%	-108.9%	13.25	0.015498	2001	1994	2004	1976	-98.7%	11.24%	1983	
Nigeria	1991	19959	0	—	6.6	5.4	77	63.3	7.2	54.4	92.9	0.033161	-41.4%	37.1%	186.25	0.037758	2003	1989	2004	1997	-41.4%	4.80%	1991	
Nigeria	2009	—	0	11.8	25.3	11.7	30.1	7.7	-0.5	307	92.9	0.033161	-230.5%	-204.9%	186.25	0.037758	2003	1989	2004	1997	-230.5%	13%	2009	
Norway	1991	1993	5.1	2.7	16.9	4.2	16.4	19.2	0.5	13.2	39	0.014205	-66.2%	69.7%	11.25	0.003581	1971	1975	1972	1998	-66.2%	22%	1991	
Panama	1988	1989	85	12.9	3.6	3.2	—	-2.6	0.1	70	15.25	0.022407	359.0%	74.3%	13	0.013864	2009	1973	2004	1993	359.0%	23%	1990	
Paraguay	1995	1995	15.3	12.9	27.3	23.8	8.1	-1.2	3.2	5.6	7.1	0.018056	-21.1%	42.0%	4.25	0.022473	1993	1976	1985	2001	-21.1%	9%	1995	
Peru	1983	19838	55.2	—	16.8	9.7	—	14.3	5.2	21	52	0.018723	-59.6%	79.2%	44.75	0.179575	1985	1997	2008	1989	-59.6%	11%	1983	
Philippines	1983	1986	91.7	3	19.4	1.5	19	44.8	8.4	79	97	0.022032	-18.6%	79.1%	34.75	0.057784	1989	1974	1980	1991	-18.6%	8%	1983	
Philippines	1997	20019	0	13.2	1.4	0.7	20	10.4	0.8	113	97	0.022032	16.5%	14.4%	34.75	0.057784	1989	1974	1980	1991	16.5%	13.18%	1997	
Poland	1992	1994	—	3.5	45.9	8.7	24	-21.6	-0.7	86	93	0.050444	-7.5%	-0.5%	110	0.032766	2002	2012	1984	1974	-7.5%	14%	1990	
Portugal	2008	—	36.8	0	18	16.7	7.3	33.6	8.3	114	22.6	0.031033	404.4%	0.0%	7.75	0.031033	1990	1991	1989	1993	404.4%	41%	2008	
Romania	1990	19928	—	0.6	129.1	—	30	—	6.3	95	55	0.017438	72.7%	78.4%	46	0.038217	1983	2003	1998	1988	72.7%	13.30%	1990	
Russia	1998	19988	—	0.1	23.7	21.1	40	-7.1	—	322	221	0.08369	45.7%	-70.3%	243	0.093079	1996	2002	1979	1995	45.7%	21.00%	1997	
Russia	2008	—	0	2.3	24.8	23.9	9.6	6.4	1	354	221	0.08369	60.2%	-189.8%	243	0.093079	1996	2002	1979	1995	60.2%	31%	2009	
San Tomé & Príncipe	1992	19928	1.9	—	—	—	—	90	-706.3	—	0.6	2.5	0.017504	-76.0%	21.0%	12	0.007481	2006	2013	2011	2009	-76.0%	18%	1988
Senegal	1988	1991	5.6	17	74.7	6.6	50	-14.2	2	5.5	23.7	0.0106	-76.8%	78.1%	6.25	0.072463	1982	1981	1997	1999	-76.8%	7.80%	1990	
Sierra Leone	1990	19949	34.5	—	0	0	45	62.9	-0.8	4.8	34	0.009875	-85.9%	73.5%	24	0.023405	1979	1981	2003	2010	-85.9%	19%	1990	
Slovak Rep	198811	20029	44.2	—	13	4.8	35	15.4	-1.0	65	32	0.032122	103.1%	-100.1%	34	0.061784	1996	1980	1993	2013	103.1%	20%	1995	
Slovenia	1992	1992	—	14.6	10	—	—	3.6	—	15.6	12.26	0.021102	27.2%	43.1%	1.5	0.040029	1977	1995	1980	1984	27.2%	20%	1992	
Slovenia	2008	—	38	3.6	10.2	9.6	12.1	18	8.3	33.5	12.26	0.021102	173.9%	-514.0%	1.5	0.040029	1977	1995	1980	1984	173.9%	42%	2009	
Spain	1977	19819	58.5	5.6	7.6	3.5	5.8	3.8	—	19.7	89	0.036247	-77.9%	73.3%	107	0.029919	2004	2005	1988	2001	-77.9%	12%	1980	
Spain	2008	—	38.7	3.8	8.3	6.4	5.8	30.7	8.3	281	89	0.036247	215.7%	-240.9%	107	0.029919	2004	2005	1988	2001	215.7%	31%	2009	
Sri Lanka	1989	1991	19.6	5	8	2	35	-5.5	-1.0	36.2	90	0.016084	-59.8%	74.0%	99	0.058213	2010	1980	1987	2004	-59.8%	11%	1989	
Swaziland	1995	19999	45.7	—	3.6	3.2	—	2.5	-1.0	17	16	0.008179	6.3%	63.0%	6	0.034404	1983	2002	1988	1989	6.3%	15.43%	1995	
Sweden	1991	1995	31.6	3.6	3.1	0.2	13	36.2	5.1	15.4	28	0.030695	-45.0%	16.7%	29.25	0.047734	1977	1998	2001	1979	-45.0%	30%	1990	
Sweden	2008	—	25.5	0.7	13.2	13	2	11.1	6.3	150	28	0.030695	435.7%	-479.3%	29.25	0.047734	1977	1998	2001	1979	435.7%	34%	2009	
Switzerland	2008	—	0	1.1	4.6	3	0.5	-0.2	7.6	187	35	0.030695	434.3%	-572.1%	25.25	0.053325	1992	2002	1990	1980	434.3%	23%	2007	
Tanzania	1987	1988	0	10	100.9	97.6	70	64.6	—	4	31	0.015154	-87.1%	69.8%	27	0.062873	1985	2008	1979	2006	-87.1%	17%	1990	
Thailand	1983	1983	24.8	0.7	8.5	2	—	15.7	0.3	23	117	0.025845	-80.3%	71.9%	175.75	0.062236	2011	1980	2012	1992	-80.3%	13%	1983	
Thailand	1997	2000	109.3	43.8	5.1	4.4	33	42.1	3.9	97.8	117	0.025845	-16.4%	-33.4%	175.75	0.062236	2011	1980	2012	1992	-16.4%	10%	1997	
Togo	1993	1994	38.5	—	6.2	1.7	—	23.8	-3.0	9.2	16.5	0.014055	-44.2%	69.8%	33	0.015152	1997	1998	2011	2005	-44.2%	16.10%	1993	
Tunisia	1991	1991	1.3	3	31.5	15.1	—	4.2	0.1	11.3	46.75	0.0216	-75.8%	53.1%	27.75	0.02068	1999	2000	2002	1995	-75.8%	17%	1991	
Turkey	1982	1984	35	2.5	71.7	29.3	—	12.3	2.4	37	150	0.0347	-75.3%	59.1%	215.5	0.028919	2004	2005	2008	2007	-75.3%	12.00%	1982	
Turkey	2000	2001	37	32	20.5	15.2	27.6	15.3	—	216	150	0.0347	44.0%	19.9%	215.5	0.028919	2004	2005	2008	2007	44.0%	12%	1995	
Uganda	1994	1994	0	—	7.6	3.9	—	-26.9	0.6	15.3	95	0.017052	-83.9%	47.8%	62.5	0.019901	1988	1997	2004	1977	-83.9%	11.70%	1994	
Ukraine	1998	1999	0	0	19.1	3.3	62.4	6	3.4	141	56	0.031556	151.8%	-74.2%	20.25	0.046124	1994	1990	1982	1983	151.8%	39%	1996	
Ukraine	2008	—	0	4.5	30.1	9.2	15.5	28.9	1.7	222	56	0.031556	296.4%	-300.2%	20.25	0.046124	1994	1990	1982	1983	296.4%	41%	2009	
United Kingdom	2007	—	25.6	8.8	9	5.6	4	24.4	9.4	352	173	0.07399	103.5%	-142.1%	179	0.08137	1980	1997	2002	1988	103.5%	45%	2009	
United States	1988	—	0	3.7	0.1	0.1	4.1	10.5	-0.1	302	292	0.100143	3.4%	33.7%	305	0.111224	2000	1982	1984	1995	3.4%	13%	1985	
United States	2007	—	30.6	4.5	4.7	4.7	5	23.6	7.9	365.7	292	0.100143	25.2%	33.2%	305	0.111224	2000	1982	1984	1995	25.2%	25%	2009	
Uruguay	1981	19859	38.1	31.2	24.6	18.5	—	83.3	3.2	5.7	7	0.032031	-18.6%	-169.6%	4.75	0.02449	1998	1993	1997	1989	-18.6%	14.40%	1981	

